Alabama can use its own congressional map for 2026 elections.

Record source: CourtListener

Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 Per Curiam SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 25A1314 _________________ WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v. EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY _________________ No. 25A1315 _________________ WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v. BOBBY SINGLETON, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY _________________ No. 25A1316 _________________ WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v. MARCUS CASTER, ET AL. ON APPLICATION FOR STAY [June 2, 2026] PER CURIAM. In Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026), to resolve the tension between vote-dilution claims under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and our colorblind Constitution, we updated the standards for §2 liability established by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). Under Gingles, to prove a §2 violation, a plaintiff must first establish three preconditions. First, the minority group must be large and geographically compact enough to be a majority in a reasonably configured congressional dis- trict, meaning that the district “comports with traditional districting criteria.” Callais, 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN Per Curiam 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the minority group must be politically cohesive. Third, the majority group must vote enough as a bloc to defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. Ibid. After establishing those three preconditions, the plaintiff must prove that the polit- ical process was not equally open to minority voters based on the totality of the circumstances. Ibid. Callais updated these standards. As relevant here, we held that for plaintiffs to satisfy the first Gingles precondi- tion, a plaintiff ’s alternative map “must meet all the State’s legitimate districting objectives” “just as well” as the State’s own map. 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 29) (emphasis added). Those legitimate districting objectives, we held, in- clude “the State’s specified political goals” and “any other goal not prohibited by the Constitution.” Ibid. A plaintiff also “cannot use race as a districting criterion” in preparing the alternative map. Ibid. To prove the second and third preconditions, a plaintiff “must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation” and “show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 30). These updates, we held, were necessary to avoid requiring congressional maps under §2 that would be unconstitutional racial gerryman- ders. After Callais, we vacated District Court injunctions that prevented the State of Alabama from using a congressional map that it enacted in 2023. See Allen v. Caster, 608 U. S. ___ (2026). The District Court had held that the State’s map violated §2 because it had only one district in which black voters were a majority and did not include an addi- tional “[b]lack-opportunity” district. Singleton v. Allen, 782 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1114, 1309 (ND Ala. 2025). The District Court also concluded that the 2023 map violated the Four- teenth Amendment because it constituted a deliberate “re- fus[al] to satisfy the remedial requirements” it previously  Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 3 Per Curiam imposed and an attempt to avoid a future judgment requir- ing the same remedy. Id., at 1355. Two weeks after we vacated its injunction, the District Court entered another injunction on largely the same grounds. State officials immediately applied to this Court for a stay of this injunction. At this preliminary stage, the State has shown that it is entitled to interim relief from the District Court’s injunc- tion. See Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citi- zens, 607 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025) (slip op., at 1–2). The State is likely to succeed on the merits as to both claims. As to intentional vote dilution, the District Court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith, see Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 10 (2024), because it interpreted the State’s legal disa- greement with the court’s earlier remedial order as proof of discriminatory animus. Cf. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 608–609 (2018). And, as to both claims, the District Court’s analysis departed from Callais. Under Callais, the District Court was required to deny relief unless the plaintiffs’ al- ternative map performed “just as well” with respect to all of the State’s constitutionally permissible districting crite- ria. 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 29). Yet, the District Court found a violation even though the plaintiffs’ alternative map would not perform just as well as to the State’s consti- tutionally permissible criteria of keeping together the Gulf Coast community of interest and avoiding the pairing of in- cumbents. The District Court also failed to follow our in- struction in Callais that the mere fact that voters of differ- ent races vote for different parties is not relevant to proving racially polarized voting patterns. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 30). The State has also made a strong showing of irreparable harm and that the equities and public interest favor it. We have repeatedly cautioned that lower federal courts should not “alter the election rules on the eve of an election.” 4 ALLEN v. MILLIGAN Per Curiam Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam). Here, the District Court interposed itself into Alabama’s ongoing efforts to conduct its imminent 2026 congressional elections under maps that its elected representatives selected. Its view that conducting the elections under court-imposed maps would be more convenient for the State was not a valid justification for that intervention. While federal courts should not impose changes close to an election, ibid., States are free to decide for themselves whether last-mi- nute changes to an election are in their best interests. The applications for stay presented to JUSTICE THOMAS and by him referred to the Court are granted. The May 26, 2026, order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, case Nos. 2:21–cv–1530 and 2:21–cv–1291 is stayed pending the timely docketing of the appeal in this Court. Should the jurisdictional statement be timely filed, this order shall remain in effect pending this Court’s action on the appeal. If the appeal is dismissed, or the judgment affirmed, this order shall terminate automat- ically. In the event jurisdiction is noted or postponed, this order will remain in effect pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. The May 26, 2026, order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Al- abama, case No. 2:21–cv–1536, is stayed pending the timely filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari. Should the peti- tion for a writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall termi- nate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court. It is so ordered.  Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 1 SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES _________________ No. 25A1314 _______________

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