Federal telecom fines are valid even without a jury deciding the penalty.

Record source: CourtListener

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2025 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Syllabus FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, ET AL. v. AT&T, INC. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 25–406. Argued April 21, 2026—Decided June 4, 2026* The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, authorizes the Federal Communications Commission to investigate regulated parties for sus- pected violations of the communications laws and to seek monetary forfeitures for violations of those laws. 47 U. S. C. §503(b). In these cases, the Commission investigated cellular service providers AT&T and Verizon (collectively, the carriers) regarding their treatment of customer location data. Believing that the carriers had violated laws and regulations requiring them to take reasonable steps to keep loca- tion data confidential, the FCC sought forfeitures from the carriers. The Commission first issued the carriers notices of apparent liability under §503(b)(4), which specified the factual and legal bases for the forfeitures the Commission sought. After reviewing the carriers’ re- sponses, the Commission “determined” that the carriers were liable and “assessed” penalties of roughly $57 million against AT&T and $47 million against Verizon. §§503(b)(1), (b)(2)(E). Once the Commission issues an order, the recipient has two options. First, it may seek review in the court of appeals under the Hobbs Act. See 28 U. S. C. §2342(1). The court of appeals, sitting without a jury, then reviews the order on the administrative record under the stand- ards set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. 47 U. S. C. §402(a); —————— *Together with No. 25–567, Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 2 FCC v. AT&T, INC. Syllabus 28 U. S. C. §2347(a); 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq., and §701 et seq. The recip- ient may also opt to do nothing. In the event of nonpayment of a for- feiture penalty “determined under [§503(b)(4)],” the penalty “shall be recoverable . . . in a civil suit in the name of the United States.” 47 U. S. C. §504(a). The Commission may then refer the matter to the Department of Justice, which in turn may—but need not—bring a civil suit within five years of the issuance of the order. 28 U. S. C. §2462. That suit “shall be a trial de novo.” 47 U. S. C. §504(a). The regulated party may, of course, pay the forfeiture voluntarily. But until it does, or the court in a §504 enforcement action orders payment, the Com- mission may not use the “notice of apparent liability . . . to the preju- dice of” the party in other Commission proceedings. §504(c). Here, the carriers paid their penalties and filed petitions for review in their respective Courts of Appeals. They argued that requiring for- feiture without the opportunity for a jury trial violates the Seventh Amendment. The Fifth Circuit granted AT&T’s petition for review and vacated the Commission’s order. The court held that the FCC’s en- forcement procedures violate the Seventh Amendment because by the time the Commission issues a forfeiture order, it “has already found the facts, interpreted the law, adjudged guilt, and levied punish- ment”—all without the involvement of a jury. 149 F. 4th 491, 503. The Second Circuit denied Verizon’s petition for review on the ground that the FCC’s forfeiture order did not itself compel payment; the Depart- ment of Justice “needs to initiate a collection action” under §504 before the carrier can be made to pay. 156 F. 4th 86, 106. The court thus held that the Commission does not violate the Seventh Amendment when it issues forfeiture orders without a jury. See id., at 107. This Court granted certiorari as to both decisions to resolve the conflict. Held: Because forfeiture orders issued under §503(b)(4) do not defini- tively resolve the parties’ legal obligations, and the FCC’s factual find- ings in its forfeiture proceedings are not conclusive, it does not violate the Seventh Amendment for the Commission to issue forfeiture orders without the involvement of a jury. Pp. 6–14. (a) The FCC’s forfeiture proceedings fit comfortably within the Court’s Seventh Amendment precedents. The Seventh Amendment “preserve[s]” the right to trial by jury in “Suits at common law,” and applies in all proceedings in which “legal rights” are to be “settle[d],” Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447. It does not, however, “prescribe at what stage” of a legal dispute “a trial by jury must, if demanded, be had.” Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 23. The Amendment requires only that, before legal rights and obligations are conclusively “ascertained and determined,” Parsons, 3 Pet., at 447, a party has the chance to insist that a jury make the “ultimate determination of issues of fact,” Ex parte Peterson, 253 U. S. 300, 310. Consistent with these  Cite as: 608 U. S. ___ (2026) 3 Syllabus principles, this Court has upheld nonjury adjudications making initial findings of fact that are subject to de novo review in a subsequent jury trial. See, e.g., Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U. S. 412; Peterson, 253 U. S., at 310. Given the similar features of the Commission’s en- forcement scheme, the Commission may issue forfeiture orders with- out the involvement of a jury. The forfeiture orders at issue in these cases did not settle the carri- ers’ legal obligations because they did not create an obligation to pay. The statute nowhere gives the Commission the authority to execute on a forfeiture order; a recipient of a forfeiture order incurs no penalties for nonpayment; interest does not accrue on the sum; and under §504(c) the Commission cannot hold “the existence of a notice of liabil- ity or an order of forfeiture” against a regulated party “unless the for- feiture has been paid or a court” has ordered payment. Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 564 F. 2d 496, 500 (CADC); see also 15 FCC Rcd. 303, 304. The statute thus prevents the Commission from penal- izing a party for failing to act in response to the mere existence of a forfeiture order, which in turn suggests that the party need not comply in the first place. The orders also did not reflect the ultimate determination of any fact. The statute provides that forfeitures under §503(b)(4) “shall be recoverable,” exclusively, in a “trial de novo.” §504(a). Thus, for the purpose of a §504 trial—the only means by which the Government can collect a penalty—it is as if the Commission never found any facts at all. Before a regulated party can be made to pay, the jury gets the last word. Pp. 6–9. (b) The carriers insist that they actually must pay because §503 uses words that sound mandatory—the Commission “determine[s]” whether a forfeiture is appropriate, “assesse[s]” the “amount” of such a penalty, and “impose[s]” that penalty. §§503(b)(1), (b)(2)(E), (b)(4). But the proper understanding of such statutory terms depends on “their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States, 598 U. S. 264, 275 (internal quot

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