7th Circuit upholds 24-month sentence for supervised release violations, finding the judge properly focused on…

Record source: CourtListener

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-2201 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JERMAINE STAPLETON, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. No. 20-cr-00066 — William M. Conley, Judge. ____________________ ARGUED JANUARY 28, 2026 — DECIDED JULY 16, 2026 ____________________ Before HAMILTON, MALDONADO, and TAIBLESON, Circuit Judges. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge. After defendant Jermaine Sta- pleton violated numerous conditions of his supervised re- lease, the district court revoked his supervision and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment and four years’ supervised release. Stapleton appeals, arguing that the court impermissi- bly considered retributive factors in imposing the sentence. We disagree and affirm. 2 No. 25-2201 I. Background Stapleton, who had been convicted of possessing metham- phetamine intended for distribution, was released on super- vision in September 2024. But within two months of release, Stapleton failed to attend mandatory random drug tests and tested positive for both fentanyl and methamphetamine. His probation officer therefore filed a petition to revoke his super- vised release, and the district court issued a warrant for Sta- pleton’s arrest. Stapleton was eventually arrested in Minne- sota on state charges of possessing fentanyl and providing false information to an officer. And after a conviction on the latter charge, he was sentenced by the state court to time served and transferred to federal custody for adjudication of the pending revocation petition. The district court revoked Stapleton’s supervised release, but upon Stapleton’s request, the court deferred sentencing him so he could enter a residential drug treatment program. The court had been skeptical of Stapleton’s proposal because Stapleton had never demonstrated sustained sobriety, but it nonetheless permitted Stapleton to seek treatment, with the warning that if he failed to comply with his terms of supervi- sion again, he would face a longer term of incarceration. Un- fortunately, Stapleton failed to report to the treatment pro- gram as scheduled. Stapleton was again arrested in Minneap- olis about a week later for drug possession and providing false information to an officer. A hearing on the deferred sentencing occurred in July 2025. At the hearing, the district court considered Stapleton’s recent violations—including repeated drug use, failure to complete treatment, failure to attend drug screenings, and failure to report to his probation officer. The court also com- No. 25-2201 3 mented that Stapleton’s “crash and burn in response to a unique opportunity to own his profound drug addiction demonstrates just how far he is from confronting that need.” And the court weighed whether a sentence within the 21- to 27-month advisory range would be enough to “send th[e] message” to Stapleton that “there are consequences for ac- tions, in this case, the defendant lacking the insight into his own needs and repeating a pattern that now goes back dec- ades and somehow expecting a different result.” After hear- ing from the parties, the court spoke with Stapleton and en- couraged him to seek treatment and “follow a different path.” The court then imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 24 months, followed by another four-year term of supervised re- lease. The court explained that its intent with the sentence was “to hold [Stapleton] accountable for his violations, to protect the community, and to promote specific and general deter- rence.” It added that it hoped Stapleton would accept help from others to change his behavior moving forward. II. Discussion On appeal, Stapleton contends that the district court im- properly considered retributive factors when determining his revocation sentence. The parties disagree on the proper stand- ard of review, but we need not resolve their dispute—the dis- trict court did not err under any standard. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), a court may sentence a de- fendant to a term of imprisonment upon revocation of super- vised release based on its consideration of certain factors set forth in § 3553(a). For example, a court may consider the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of 4 No. 25-2201 the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed ed- ucational or vocational training, medical care, or other correc- tional treatment in the most effective manner. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)(3), 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). But courts may not consider the retributive factors of § 3553(a)(2)(A) in revocation proceedings—namely, the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the of- fense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just pun- ishment for the offense. Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 195–97 (2025). In the context of a revocation hearing, the “of- fense” referenced in § 3553(a)(2)(A) is “the underlying crime of conviction, not the violation of the supervised-release con- ditions.” Id. at 193–94. In short, a district court cannot formu- late a revocation sentence based on “the need to exact retribu- tion for the defendant’s underlying crime.” Id. at 194–95. But it can still consider the “nature and circumstances” of that un- derlying offense for purposes of “deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” Id. at 200. We consider a district court’s sentencing remarks holisti- cally and in context. United States v. Dawson, 980 F.3d 1156, 1163–64 (7th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Malinowski, 129 F.4th 431, 435 (7th Cir. 2025). Under any standard of review, we “must affirm where, taken as a whole, the record demon- strates that the court based its sentence on considerations au- thorized by law.” Malinowski, 129 F.4th at 435 (cleaned up). A holistic view of the record here assures us that the court did not impose its sentence as retribution for Stapleton’s un- derlying offense. Rather, the court heavily invoked “forward- looking” themes of rehabilitation and deterrence. See Esteras, 606 U.S. at 196 (emphasis omitted). The court focused on these factors, discussing Stapleton’s need to address his addiction No. 25-2201 5 and expressing its hope that the sentence would set Stapleton on a “different path.” And it never referenced punishment, the seriousness of the underlying offense, or the need to pro- mote respect for the law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Addi- tionally, the court’s decision to impose a within-guidelines sentence, after it had deferred sentencing to allow Stapleton to pursue treatment, further suggests that the sentence was imposed not for retributive reasons but as a last-resort effort to encourage Stapleton to accept help and change his behav- ior. Stapleton argues that two specific statements show that the court inappropriately considered retribution for his un- derlying crime. Stapleton first points to the court’s use of the term “consequences” and its expressed desire to send a “mes- sage.” But read in context, these statements focused on Sta- pleton’s struggles with addiction and the court’s hopes for him to find another path to sobriety, not the underlying crime. And consequences are not always punitive. A consequence is simply “[a] result that follows as an effect of something that came before.” Con

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