An immigration detainee must receive a bond hearing the government cannot deny him.

Record source: CourtListener

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA ) JONATHAN JAIME FLORES, ) ) NO. 3:26-CV-120 ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) ) LEONARD ODDO, WARDEN, ) ) Respondent. ) ) ) ) MEMORANDUM ORDER Pending before the Court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF 1) filed by Jonathan Jaime Flores. Respondent Leonard Oddo, the Warden of Moshannon Valley Processing Center, filed his response on March 4, 2026 (ECF 5). The petition is now fully briefed and ready for disposition. On careful review, the Court will grant it in part and issue a writ. Mr. Flores is a citizen of Peru and “fled to the United States through the Southern border on or about July [1], 2022.” ECF 1 at 3; ECF 5 at 1. Soon after his unlawful entry, he was “arrested by United States Border Patrol, was issued an I- 94[,] and was released into the United States.” ECF 1 at 3. On May 24, 2023, Mr. Flores “was served with a Notice to Appear (NTA)” and was notified that his individual hearing was March 18, 2026. Id. Mr. Flores and his family then settled in New Jersey, applied for asylum, and obtained employment. Id. On July 15, 2025, the day after he was charged in a domestic dispute with simple assault and terroristic threats, Mr. Flores “was arrested by [Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)] and later transferred to Moshannon Valley Processing Center, where he is currently detained.” Id. at 3-4; ECF 1-8 at 3. As of the parties’ last update to this Court, these criminal charges appear to still be pending in New Jersey. ECF 1-5 at 9; ECF 5-2 at 19. On September 17, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Mr. Flores’s application for asylum and other forms of relief. ECF 1 at 4; ECF 5-3 at 3. Mr. Flores then timely filed an appeal with the Board of Immigration Appeals on November 17, 2025, which also remains pending as of the parties’ last update. ECF 1 at 4; ECF 1-7 at 2. In his petition, Mr. Flores asserts that he should be detained under § 1226(a), but is “mistakenly detained under § 1225.” ECF 1 at 5. Specifically, he contends that, under established precedent in this Court, both the length of his time in the United States and his apprehension away from the southern border weigh in favor of his classification under § 1226(a). Id. at 5-6. Further, citing to the Fifth Amendment, Mr. Flores argues that his detention without a bond hearing violates his substantive due process rights under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and his procedural due process rights under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Id. at 7-10. As for relief, Mr. Flores requests that the Court “[a]ssume jurisdiction over this matter; grant his “writ of habeas corpus ordering Respondent to immediately release Petitioner from physical custody, or in the [alternative], hold a bond hearing in which the government bears the burden to justify his detention[;]” “[e]nter a preliminary and injunctive relief enjoining Respondent[s] from further unlawful [detention] of Petitioner under § 1225(b)[;]” and “[g]rant any other and further relief that this Honorable Court deems just and proper.” Id. at 10. In contrast, Respondent asserts that, due to the pending criminal charges in New Jersey, Mr. Flores is properly detained under the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c)(1)(E) and is thus not entitled to a bond hearing. ECF 5 at 2-4. Alternatively, Respondent argues that Mr. Flores is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). ECF 5 at 4-10. 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court rejects both of Respondent’s arguments and agrees with Mr. Flores that he is subject to detention under § 1226(a). In 2025, the Laken Riley Act amended § 1226(c) and mandated that immigration authorities must detain aliens who are inadmissible or removable from the United States and who have engaged in certain criminal activities. See Laken Riley Act, S. 5, 119th Cong. (2025). As such, § 1226(c)(1) now provides that the Attorney General “shall take into custody any alien who…(i) is inadmissible under paragraph 6(A), 6(C), or (7) of section 1182(a) of this title; and (ii) is charged with, is arrested for, is convicted of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft, larceny, shoplifting, or assault of a law enforcement officer offense, or any crime that results in death or serious bodily injury to another person.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). 1 The Court notes that Respondent only argues that Mr. Flores is subject to mandatory detention under two grounds: § 1225(b)(2) and § 1226(c)(1)(E). So the Court only addresses these grounds. When reviewing an immigration habeas petition, federal district courts generally have jurisdiction to review whether a petitioner’s criminal history properly triggers mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E) if the government relies on that history to justify the detention. See, e.g., Santos-Barahona v. Jamison, No. 26-CV- 1776-JMY, 2026 WL 1047056 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2026) (finding jurisdiction to review such a claim); Lopez v. McShane, No. 26-cv-771, 2026 WL 767779 (E.D. Pa. March 18, 2026) (same). When conducting this review, “the terms ‘burglary’, ‘theft’, ‘larceny’, ‘shoplifting’, ‘assault of a law enforcement officer’, and ‘serious bodily injury’ have the meanings given such terms in the jurisdiction in which the acts occurred.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2). Thus, because the alleged criminal acts in this matter occurred in New Jersey, the Court shall rely on New Jersey’s definition of serious bodily injury (and, for contrast’s sake, bodily injury) when evaluating the applicability of § 1226(c)(1)(E) to Mr. Flores’s detention.2 Here, as its basis for mandatory detention, Respondent points to Mr. Flores’s arrest for simple assault under New Jersey § 2C:12-1a(1), thus implying that this is a crime involving “death” or “serious bodily injury.”3 See ECF No. 5 at 3. It is not. 2 Under New Jersey state law, “bodily injury” is defined as “physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition[,]” while “serious bodily injury” is defined as “bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ[.]” N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:11-1 (2025). 3 The Court notes that Respondent does not allege which phrase of the Laken Riley Act applies to Mr. Flores’s arrest for simple assault. See generally ECF 5. It i

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