A consumer suing a credit bureau gets a jury trial on whether an arbitration agreement…
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A consumer suing a credit bureau gets a jury trial on whether an arbitration agreement…
Why it matters
In Jones v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ruled that plaintiff Rachel Jones is entitled to a jury trial on the question of whether she ever agreed to arbitrate her Fair Credit Reporting Act claims against Experian. The court rejected Experian's argument that Jones needed to make a specific jury demand on the arbitration formation issue, finding that her general pleading demand for 'a trial by jury on all issues so triable' was sufficient under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Who it affects
This ruling most directly affects consumers who dispute the existence of an arbitration agreement with a credit reporting agency or other company, as it supports their ability to have a jury, rather than a judge alone, decide whether they ever agreed to arbitrate. It also affects businesses like Experian that rely on arbitration agreements to resolve disputes, since they may face a jury rather than a bench determination on threshold contract formation questions in this federal district.
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Decision issued Jul 10, 2026
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- Decision issued Jul 10, 2026
- Possible rehearingParties can ask the same court to reconsider.
- Possible appeal to the circuit court
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DEEPER READ
The central question in this case was a procedural one: when a consumer flatly denies ever signing an arbitration agreement with a credit reporting company, who decides whether that agreement exists, and does a general jury demand cover that question? Rachel Jones sued Experian under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, alleging it failed to provide her complete consumer file and failed to properly investigate disputed information, causing credit denials and other harm. Experian responded by moving to compel arbitration. Because Jones unequivocally denied the existence of any arbitration agreement, the court found that Sixth Circuit precedent required a trial on the question of contract formation before the arbitration motion could be decided. The dispute then narrowed to whether that contract formation trial would be a jury trial or a bench trial. Experian argued that Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act sets up a specific procedure for demanding a jury on the arbitration issue, and that Jones failed to follow it because she never made a demand specifically targeting the arbitration formation question. Jones responded that her pleading already demanded a jury trial on all issues so triable, which she argued covered the arbitration formation question as well. The court sided with Jones. It analyzed Section 4 of the FAA, which says a party may demand a jury trial on the issue of whether an arbitration agreement was made, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, which says a general jury demand in a pleading covers all triable issues unless the demand specifies otherwise. The court found that Jones's demand for 'a trial by jury on all issues so triable' was sufficient to invoke her jury trial right on the contract formation question. Experian relied heavily on a case from the Eleventh Circuit, Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., which held that the FAA's specific procedures for demanding a jury displace the general demand procedures in Rule 38. The court acknowledged Burch but declined to follow it, noting it is only persuasive authority and that the Sixth Circuit has not addressed the issue. The court disagreed with the reasoning in Burch and found it inapplicable here. As a result, the court deferred ruling on Experian's motion to compel arbitration and denied Experian's motion for a bench trial on the arbitration issue. The case will proceed to a jury trial to determine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION RACHEL JONES, Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-10114 District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith v. Magistrate Judge Anthony P. Patti EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., Defendant. ___________________________________/ OPINION AND ORDER DEFERRING EXPERIAN’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND STAY THESE PROCEEDINGS (ECF No. 18) AND DENYING EXPERIAN’S MOTION TO DETERMINE BENCH TRIAL ON ARBITRATION ISSUE (ECF No. 33) I. OPINION A. Background Plaintiff Rachel Jones, proceeding in pro per, initiated this fee-paid action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act on January 13, 2025 and included a request for a trial by jury in her pleading. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (“Experian”) failed to provide a complete consumer file and failed to properly investigate disputed information, which resulted in credit denials and other damages. Defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration on October 14, 2025. (ECF No. 18.) There is a dispute over whether Plaintiff is subject to arbitration because she unequivocally denies the existence of an arbitration agreement between herself and Defendant. Because Plaintiff has placed the existence of the arbitration agreement directly in dispute, Sixth Circuit precedent requires a trial on the issue of contract formation. Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002). The issue to be resolved at trial is whether a valid arbitration agreement exists between the parties. The issue presently before the Court is whether the trial will be conducted as a bench trial or a jury trial. B. Pending Motions Judge Goldsmith referred this case to me for pretrial matters. (ECF No. 5.) The parties subsequently consented to my “exercise of jurisdiction over all issues related to Experian’s pending Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay These Proceedings” (ECF No. 32, PageID.666) and Judge Goldsmith referred the case to me in accordance with the consent. (ECF No. 35.) Currently before the Court is Experian’s October 14, 2025, motion to compel arbitration and stay these proceedings (ECF No. 18), as to which Plaintiff filed a timely response (ECF Nos. 19, 21), and Experian filed replies (ECF Nos. 22, 26.) As noted in the text-only order of March 4, 2026: Because there is an underlying factual dispute as to whether Plaintiff entered into an arbitration agreement, before turning to the motion to compel the Court must first conduct a trial on contract formation. The parties dispute whether the issue is to be tried to a jury or to the bench. Accordingly, Defendant shall file a memorandum, no longer than 5 pages, by March 11, 2026 setting forth Defendants’ [sic] argument about whether Plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial on the issue of contract formation. Plaintiff shall file her response by March 18, 2026, also limited to five pages. […] [U]ntil the Court has resolved the factual question regarding contract formation, Defendant's motion to compel arbitration (ECF No. 18) is HELD IN ABEYANCE. (Text-Only Order dated March 4, 2026.) Consequently, the Court now considers Experian’s March 11, 2026 brief in support of bench trial on the issue of contract formation (ECF No. 33), i.e., a motion to determine bench or jury trial on the arbitration/contract formation issue, as to which Plaintiff has filed a response (ECF No. 36). That motion is now ready for decision. C. Discussion The parties agree that the arbitration issue should be resolved at trial, but dispute whether it should be by jury or bench trial. Experian argues that the parties should proceed to a bench trial because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) establishes a specific procedure and timeline for demanding a jury trial with which Plaintiff has allegedly not complied. Experian claims that the plaintiff needed to demand a jury on the specific issue of the “‘making of the arbitration agreement’ (i.e., contract formation)” and that the general jury demand made in the pleading does not suffice. (ECF No. 33, PageID.669 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 4).) Jones argues that the general demand made in her pleading applies to all issues triable by jury, which would include the issue of the making of the arbitration agreement. (ECF No. 36.) Her jury demand specifically states: “Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.28 (emphasis added).) This issue is governed by Section 4 of the FAA and Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 4 of the FAA states, “if the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. The Act also states, “the party alleged to be in default may… on or before the return day of the notice of application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall” provide for a jury trial on the issue. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added). Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party may demand a jury trial by written demand, which “may be included in a pleading[,]” and “may specify the issues that it wishes to have tried by a jury; otherwise, it is considered to have demanded a jury trial on all the issues so triable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b)-(c). Rule 38 also states that this right is “preserved to the parties inviolable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(a). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern court proceedings under the FAA, “except” where the FAA provides “other procedures.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(6)(B). Experian primarily relies on Burch v. P.J. Cheese, Inc., 861 F.3d 1338, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2017), to explain why a general jury demand should not invoke the FAA’s right to a jury, arguing that Jones failed to demand a jury trial specifically on the arbitration agreement issue. Burch construes the FAA as providing a specific procedure for invoking the right to a jury. Id. at 1349. Burch states, “because Section 4 is far from ‘silent’ on the mechanisms required to invoke the statutory right to a jury trial that it provides, its procedures displace the general jury demand procedures provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38.” Id. However, Burch, an Eleventh Circuit case, is only persuasive authority, and the Sixth Circuit has not addressed this issue. This Court declines the invitation to adopt Burch’s reasoning.1 In any case, the Court disagrees with Experian’s suggestion that Jones’s jury demand did not suffice to invoke the statutory right to a jury trial under § 4 of the FAA.
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