9th Circuit revives fired Arizona prison workers' whistleblower lawsuit, finding enough evidence of retaliation to…
Hasz v. State of Arizona
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9th Circuit revives fired Arizona prison workers' whistleblower lawsuit, finding enough evidence of retaliation to let a jury decide.
Why it matters
The Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's summary judgment against two former Arizona prison employees who claimed they were fired in retaliation for blowing the whistle on prison conditions. The appeals court found the employees presented enough evidence, including suspicious timing, coordinated reassignments, and a potentially altered incident report, to create a genuine factual dispute about whether their protected speech motivated their terminations. Because the district court never reached the next steps of the legal analysis, the case was sent back for further proceedings.
Who it affects
This ruling directly affects the two former Arizona prison employees and the state agencies involved in their case. More broadly, it is relevant to public employees in the Ninth Circuit who claim they were fired or punished for speaking out on matters of public concern, as it clarifies what kinds of circumstantial evidence can be enough to get a retaliation claim to a jury.
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Decision issued Jul 21, 2026
Unpublished opinion
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- Decision issued Jul 21, 2026Unpublished opinion
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Jul 21, 2026 · Unpublished opinion
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DEEPER READ
Mark Hasz and Shaun Holland worked for the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry. After they disclosed concerns about prison conditions to their superiors, the governor, and the media, both were reassigned and eventually fired, with the stated reason being a use-of-force incident and their prior disciplinary histories. They sued under federal civil rights law, arguing the real reason was retaliation for their whistleblowing. The district court granted summary judgment against them, meaning it found no genuine factual dispute worthy of a jury trial. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reversed that decision. Under the applicable legal test, a public employee claiming retaliation must first show that the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action. The court found Hasz and Holland cleared that hurdle in three ways. First, the timing was suspicious: investigations into the incident that led to their firings began months after their disclosures, and the terminations themselves came nine to eleven months after they spoke out, a gap courts have previously recognized as supporting an inference of retaliation. Second, both employees were reassigned together to the same unit shortly after their disclosures, and Hasz was placed in a unit with no available position matching his rank, suggesting the moves were punitive rather than routine. Third, the employees presented evidence that the incident report used to justify their firings may have been altered to substitute a harsher conclusion from someone who was not even present at the incident, and that their disciplinary histories had been tolerated for years but were suddenly invoked only after they spoke out. However, the court was careful to note that establishing this initial showing does not automatically mean the employees win. The legal framework requires the employer to then have the opportunity to show either that it had adequate justification for the firings or that it would have fired the employees anyway, even without the protected speech. The district court never reached those questions because it ruled against the employees at the first step. Because those remaining issues require careful weighing of evidence rather than pure legal analysis, the Ninth Circuit sent the case back to the district court to address them. There was no dissent noted in the opinion.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARK HASZ; SHAUN HOLLAND, No. 24-5773 D.C. No. Plaintiffs - Appellants, 2:22-cv-00667-SPL v. MEMORANDUM* STATE OF ARIZONA; JAMES KIMBLE, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 15, 2026** Before: NGUYEN, OWENS, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Mark Hasz and Shaun Holland, former employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation, and Reentry (“ADCRR”), appeal pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in their action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law alleging they were fired in retaliation for whistleblowing about prison * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). conditions. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Burch v. City of Chubbuck, 146 F.4th 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2025). We reverse and remand. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a public employee plaintiff must show that: (1) he spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) he spoke as a private citizen; and (3) his protected speech was a “substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse employment action. Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Burch, 146 F.4th at 832–33. The third element may be established through direct or circumstantial evidence and ordinarily presents a question for the jury. Ulrich v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff may establish retaliatory motive with evidence that (1) the speech and adverse action were proximate in time, (2) the employer expressed opposition to the speech, or (3) the employer’s proffered explanations for the adverse action were false and pretextual. See Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 977 (9th Cir. 2003). Evidence of any one of these factors may be sufficient. Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2013). Protected speech need not be the sole cause of the adverse action. Alpha Energy Savers, Inc. v. Hansen, 381 F.3d 917, 929–30 (9th Cir. 2004). Hasz and Holland met their burden of establishing a prima facie case of a retaliatory motive in three ways. 2 24-5773 First, the timing supports an inference of retaliatory motive. See Burch, 146 F.4th at 838 (holding the “timeline of events” supported a causal connection). Nine months elapsed between Hasz’s initial whistleblowing letter to his superiors, the governor, and the media, and his termination. Eleven months elapsed between Holland’s corresponding disclosure and his termination. In addition, the investigations into the use-of-force incident that ultimately led to both terminations began four months after Hasz’s letter and seven months after Holland’s. This timing falls “within the range that has been found to support an inference that an employment decision was retaliatory.” Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1077–78 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding 11-month gap supported inference). Second, the Buckley Unit reassignments provide additional circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive. One month after Hasz’s letter and four months after Holland’s, both were reassigned to the Buckley Unit on the same date. No lieutenant position was available for Hasz because the Buckley lieutenant positions were filled, so he was assigned to oversee the kitchen. The timing and coordinated nature of the reassignments—together with Hasz’s placement in a unit with no available lieutenant position—support an inference that plaintiffs’ protected speech played a role in ADCRR’s personnel decisions, including the termination. Third, Hasz and Holland presented sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue that ADCRR’s stated reasons for terminating them were pretextual. They contend 3 24-5773 that the original use-of-force incident report—referenced during the investigations and cited in the Human Resources memorandum recommending dismissal—was altered. Specifically, they assert that Shift Commander Weston initially deemed the use of force justified and appropriate, but ADCRR later circulated a version reflecting the contrary conclusion of Lieutenant Hoyt, a shift commander who was not on site at the time of the incident. This modification, which defendants do not address in their briefing, provides circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find that ADCRR’s primary stated reason for the terminations—the use-of-force incident—was false or pretextual. See id. at 1078 (holding a superior’s misrepresentations about the reasons for an adverse action, along with departure from standard procedures, supported an inference of pretext). Defendants’ reliance on Hasz and Holland’s disciplinary histories provides further evidence of pretext. The Human Resources memorandum recommended dismissal based on the use-of-force incident in conjunction with plaintiffs’ prior disciplinary histories. Yet despite numerous prior disciplinary incidents—and although the ADCRR chart cited in the memorandum indicates dismissal could have been warranted much earlier—Hasz and Holland were not terminated until after they engaged in protected speech. A jury could therefore infer that ADCRR invoked plaintiffs’ disciplinary histories after the fact to justify terminations motivated, at least in part, by their protected disclosures. See, e.g., Anthoine v. N. 4 24-5773 Cent. Counties Consortium, 605 F.3d 740, 751–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding plaintiff presented evidence of pretext where employer tolerated misconduct until plaintiff engaged in protected speech); Allen, 283 F.3d at 1077–78 (concluding that plaintiff submitted sufficient circumstantial evidence of retaliatory motive where discipline followed criticism despite prior disputes going undisciplined). Thus, plaintiffs raised a triable dispute as to whether their protected speech was a motivating factor in their dismissal. That triable showing, however, does not itself establish a First Amendment violation. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to defendants to show steps four and five: either adequate justification for the terminations or that they would have terminated plaintiffs even absent the protected speech. See Burch, 146 F.4th at 833; Eng, 552 F.3d at 1072. These are fact-bound questions, see Ellins, 710 F.3d at 1064, that the district court did not reach. Although we may affirm on any ground supported by the record, the remaining issues turn on an assessment of the evidence rather than pure questions of law; the district court is better suited to consider them in the first instance. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); MacIntyre v. Carroll Coll., 48 F.4th 950, 956 (9th Cir. 2022). Hasz and Holland raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to whethe
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