9th Circuit upholds Attila Colar's convictions for aggravated identity theft and witness tampering, finding sufficient…
United States v. Colar
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9th Circuit upholds Attila Colar's convictions for aggravated identity theft and witness tampering, finding sufficient evidence supported each count, while separately reversing and remanding for a new trial.
Why it matters
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Colar's motion for acquittal, finding that sufficient evidence supported his convictions for aggravated identity theft, witness tampering, and conspiracy to commit witness tampering. The court found that Colar's use of other people's identities on fraudulent PPP loan applications was at the core of the fraud, and that his efforts to manipulate a witness and a doctor constituted obstruction. In a separately filed opinion issued at the same time, the court reversed his convictions and sent the case back for a new trial, but still had to rule on the evidence question to determine whether a retrial would be permitted under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
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- Who faces a new trial. More broadly
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Decision issued Jul 21, 2026
Unpublished opinion
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Jul 21, 2026 · Unpublished opinion
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Attila Colar was convicted of aggravated identity theft, witness tampering, and conspiracy to commit witness tampering related to fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loan applications and efforts to prevent a witness from testifying. He appealed the trial court's refusal to acquit him, arguing the evidence was not strong enough to support his convictions. On the identity theft counts, the court applied the standard from Dubin v. United States, which requires that the misuse of another person's identity be at the core of what made the underlying offense criminal, not just a side detail. The court found this standard was met because Colar used the names and identities of two individuals, referred to as M.B. and B.W., on PPP loan applications. Because Colar had prior fraud-related felony convictions that would have disqualified him from obtaining a PPP loan, he could not have submitted a successful application in his own name. Using others' identities was therefore central to the fraud, not incidental to it. On one application, Colar also impersonated B.W. during lender calls and forged his signature, which the court found was 'impersonating use' at the heart of the scheme. On the witness tampering counts, the court found sufficient evidence that Colar took steps to prevent M.B. from participating in a grand jury proceeding. This included arranging a power of attorney that effectively gave Colar control over communications from M.B. to M.B.'s attorney, and evidence that Colar or someone working with him contacted M.B.'s doctor to obtain a letter falsely claiming M.B. was cognitively unable to appear in court. The court rejected Colar's argument that his conduct could not constitute witness tampering because M.B. had a Fifth Amendment right not to testify. The court explained that the charge was about causing M.B.'s physical absence from the grand jury, and that a subpoenaed witness is still required to appear even if they may later invoke a privilege against self-incrimination once present. Although the court affirmed the sufficiency of the evidence, it noted that in a concurrently filed separate opinion it reversed Colar's convictions and ordered a new trial. The court explained it was required to rule on the evidence question anyway: if the evidence had been insufficient, the Double Jeopardy Clause would have barred the government from trying him again. Because the evidence was sufficient, a new trial is permitted. No dissent is mentioned in the source text.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 21 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 23-2939, 24-396 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:21-cr-00163-HSG-1 v. ATTILA COLAR, AKA Sharieff Dahood MEMORANDUM* Bey, AKA Sharieff Pasha, AKA Georgi Petrakov, AKA Dahood Shariff Bey, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 11, 2026 San Francisco, California Before: H.A. THOMAS and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges, and VERA, District Judge.** Attila Colar appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for acquittal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions for aggravated * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Hernan Diego Vera, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1); witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(1), (b)(2)(D); and conspiracy to commit witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the denial of the motion.1 We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal conviction. United States v. Grovo, 826 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2016). In doing so, we view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution” to determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation modified). 1. Sufficient evidence supports the convictions for aggravated identity theft because Colar’s use of M.B. and B.W.’s identities was “at the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal.” Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110, 114 (2023). For Counts 29 through 32, which correspond to the four June 2020 Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) applications, a rational juror could find that Colar’s use of M.B. and B.W.’s names was at the crux of the fraud. A government witness 1 In a concurrently filed opinion, we reverse Colar’s convictions and remand for new trial. See United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Even though we reverse that conviction, we must address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting it, for if the evidence were insufficient, retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.”). 2 23-2939 testified that the application required disclosure of “any felony involving fraud, bribery, embezzlement, or false statement in a loan application or an application for federal financial assistance” within the last five years. If the applicant answered yes to that question, the applicant was not eligible for a PPP loan. The government presented evidence that in November 2015, Colar was convicted of several felonies relating to fraud and tax evasion. Sufficient evidence shows that the misuse of M.B. and B.W.’s identities on the PPP loan applications “lay at the crux because the defendant could not otherwise have presented a successful [PPP loan application], which was necessary for [his] fraudulent scheme.” Motley, 168 F.4th at 600–01; see United States v. Parviz, 131 F.4th 966, 970–01 (9th Cir. 2025). For Count 33, which corresponds to the February 2021 PPP application, a rational juror could also find that Colar’s use of B.W.’s identity was at the crux of the fraud. B.W. testified that he did not submit that application. Combined with evidence that Colar maintained a cell phone labeled “[B.W.] with Family Investment Group,” and impersonated B.W. during lender calls, a rational juror could infer that Colar forged B.W.’s signature and held himself out as B.W. to Lendio. That was “impersonating use” of identifying information that “involved fraud as to ‘who’ was making the [loan-related] representations,” which was at the crux of the fraud. Parviz, 131 F.4th at 972; see United States v. Gagarin, 950 F.3d 596, 603–04 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding sufficient evidence where defendant’s 3 23-2939 forgery of her cousin’s signature “falsely conveyed the impression that [the cousin] herself certified” that the information provided in an insurance application was true); Motley, 168 F.4th at 601 (forging another’s signature on a fraudulent application “constitute[d] a separate form of fraud”). 2. Sufficient evidence supports the Count 48 witness-tampering conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1). The parties dispute whether obstructive conduct was directed at M.B. or at Dr. Gohil, but the evidence is sufficient under either theory. A rational juror could find that Colar engaged in obstructive conduct toward M.B. The government presented evidence that Colar caused M.B. to execute a power of attorney substituting a “Louis Leneir” for M.B.’s daughter and thereafter controlled communications purportedly from M.B. or Leneir to M.B.’s attorney, Betty Williams. The evidence also shows that Colar caused Williams to inform the government that M.B. was “surprisingly” willing to testify while his partner instructed the doctor not to speak with Williams after the doctor wrote a letter representing that M.B. was unable to appear. A rational juror could also find that Colar engaged in obstructive conduct toward Dr. Gohil. Dr. Gohil testified that a person claiming to be M.B.’s close family member called him and asked him to write a letter stating that M.B. could not participate in court proceedings due to cognitive impairment and that he relied 4 23-2939 on those representations. Given the government’s evidence of Colar’s established pattern of impersonation, control over communications with Williams, and role in the transmission of the completed letter to Williams for delivery to the government, a rational juror could infer that Colar was the unidentified caller. Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1167. 3. Sufficient evidence supports the Count 49 witness-tampering conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(D). Colar argues that his conduct could not have corruptly persuaded M.B. to be absent from the grand jury proceeding under United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2011), because M.B. possessed a Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. First, Doss’s privilege framework does not apply. Id. at 1190 (persuading a witness to withhold testimony does not implicate § 1512(b)(2)(D) where a witness exercises a right to remain silent, absent “some other wrongful conduct, such as coercion, intimidation, bribery, suborning perjury, etc.”). Count 49 charged Colar with causing M.B.’s physical absence from the grand jury proceeding, not with encouraging M.B. to invoke a privilege upon appearing. As a subpoenaed witness, M.B. was required to appear. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345–46 (1974) (the Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incriminating testimony without a “co-extensive” grant of immunity at the proceeding, n
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