9th Circuit overturns man's 44-count federal fraud conviction because a biased alternate juror joined deliberations…
United States v. Colar
Status and record
Your position
Do you support this decision?
An advisory read. Your position on a ruling is citizen opinion; it does not form a citizen mandate and is never a legal appeal.
Civitus citizens
Take a position above to see how verified Civitus citizens are weighing in. Positions stay sealed until you have one of your own.
The Civitus brief
AI analysis
Plain English
9th Circuit overturns man's 44-count federal fraud conviction because a biased alternate juror joined deliberations after the trial court failed to promptly investigate his expressed bias.
Why it matters
The Ninth Circuit vacated Attila Colar's conviction on 44 federal counts related to alleged Paycheck Protection Program fraud and obstruction, and ordered a new trial. The court found that an alternate juror had expressed actual bias against Colar's defense, which centered on claims of racial and religious targeting by law enforcement. The district court abused its discretion by failing to investigate that bias promptly, conducting only a belated and inadequate inquiry, and then allowing the juror to participate in the verdict, which amounted to a structural violation of Colar's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
Who it affects
This ruling directly affects Attila Colar, who will receive a new trial. More broadly, it matters for federal trial courts in the Ninth Circuit, which must now promptly investigate any colorable claim of juror bias as soon as it arises, even for alternate jurors, rather than waiting to see if the alternate is ever seated.
What happens next
Current
Decision issued Jul 21, 2026
Published opinion
Next
Possible rehearing
Parties can ask the same court to reconsider. Then: possible supreme court petition.
View possible path
- Decision issued Jul 21, 2026Published opinion
- Possible rehearingParties can ask the same court to reconsider.
- Possible Supreme Court petitionThe Supreme Court takes only a small share of petitions.
Citizens vs Court
Civitus citizens
Sealed
Take a counted position to open the tally.
Appellate court
Decision issued
Jul 21, 2026 · Published opinion
Take a position above to open the comparison.
A comparison of public sentiment with the ruling. Courts are not subject to a citizen mandate, and judges are not elected representatives.
Take action
Courts decide cases; Congress can respond with legislation. Telling your representative is the civic lever here.
Public discussion
Add a tag
Citizen opinion on this ruling, not a rehearing of the case. Similar opinions on this case can open a solution poll.
3 similar opinions open a solution poll
Loading opinions
Deeper context
Long-form analysis, legal background, and source material
Read analysisAnalysis · Source
DEEPER READ
Attila Colar, a Black Muslim man, was convicted by a jury on 44 federal counts including bank fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, obstruction, and witness tampering. His defense throughout trial was that law enforcement had targeted him because of his race and religion. Shortly after the jury was sworn in, an alternate juror told the court that he had a strong negative reaction to that defense theory and had already concluded it lacked substance and credibility. The central legal question was whether the district court handled the alternate juror's expressed bias properly. The Ninth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury, and that even one biased juror participating in a verdict is what the law calls structural error, meaning it requires automatic reversal without needing to show it changed the outcome. The appeals court found that the district court abused its discretion in two related ways. First, it delayed any meaningful investigation into the juror's bias, waiting until the juror was actually needed to fill a seat on the regular panel rather than acting promptly when the bias was first expressed. Second, when the court finally did question the juror, the inquiry was inadequate. The record as a whole left unclear whether the juror had unequivocally committed to setting aside his bias, and the court could not confirm that continued exposure to the defense theory had not reinforced it. The opinion states that this doubt should have been resolved against the juror, meaning he should have been excused. The court emphasized that a trial court has broad discretion over how to investigate juror bias, but that discretion covers the form of the inquiry, not whether to conduct one at all. A court cannot defer that obligation simply because the juror in question is an alternate. Because the juror ultimately participated in the guilty verdict, the error was structural and required reversal. The case was remanded for a new trial. The court also noted, in a separate filing, that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the charges, meaning a retrial is not barred by double jeopardy protections.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Nos. 23-2939, 24-396 Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 4:21-cr-00163- v. HSG-1 ATTILA COLAR, AKA Sharieff Dahood Bey, AKA Sharieff Pasha, AKA Georgi Petrakov, AKA Dahood OPINION Shariff Bey, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted March 11, 2026 San Francisco, California Filed July 21, 2026 Before: Holly A. Thomas and Anthony D. Johnstone, Circuit Judges, and Hernan Diego Vera, District Judge. * Opinion by Judge Johnstone * The Honorable Hernan Diego Vera, United States District Judge for the Central District of California, sitting by designation. 2 USA V. COLAR SUMMARY ** Criminal Law The panel vacated Attila Colar’s conviction on 44 counts arising from an alleged scheme to defraud the Paycheck Protection Program and efforts to obstruct the investigation, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded for a new trial. At voir dire, pro se defendant Colar, who is a Black man and a Muslim, advanced a defense theory that he maintained throughout his trial: law enforcement targeted him based on his race and religion. After the jury was impaneled, an alternate juror expressed actual bias against Colar. He told the court that he had a strong negative reaction to Colar’s defense and that he had concluded that the defense lacked substance and credibility. The panel held that the juror’s statement raised a colorable issue of whether he was actually biased, and that the district court abused its discretion by failing to promptly investigate the juror, deferring inquiry until a seat opened, and conducting an inadequate colloquy after the juror had heard evidence. The record as a whole was unclear as to whether the juror unequivocally committed to setting aside his bias, and this doubt should have been resolved against him. The court’s failure to excuse him was an abuse of discretion. These errors ultimately deprived Colar of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. USA V. COLAR 3 In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, the panel affirmed the district court’s denial of Colar’s motion for acquittal. COUNSEL Ross D. Mazer (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; Merry J. Chan, Chief, Appellate Section, Criminal Division; Craig H. Missakian, United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney, United States Department of Justice, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee. David L. Annicchiarico (argued), Law Office of David L. Annicchiarico, San Francisco, California; Robert J. Beles, Law Offices of Beles & Beles, Oakland, California; for Defendant-Appellant. 4 USA V. COLAR OPINION JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judge: The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to trial by an impartial jury. The participation of even a single biased juror in rendering a guilty verdict is structural error requiring reversal. To safeguard this right, a district court must address any signs of bias during jury selection and throughout trial. The court has broad discretion over how to investigate a juror’s impartiality. That discretion, however, governs the form of the inquiry, not whether to conduct one. Once a colorable issue of juror bias arises, the court must investigate before the juror continues to serve, and the inquiry must match the seriousness of the claim. The court cannot defer that obligation simply because the juror is an alternate. A jury convicted Attila Colar on 44 federal counts arising from an alleged scheme to defraud the Paycheck Protection Program and efforts to obstruct the investigation. At voir dire, Colar advanced a defense theory that he maintained throughout his trial: law enforcement targeted him based on his race and religion. After the jury was impaneled, an alternate juror expressed actual bias against Colar. He told the court that he had a strong negative reaction to Colar’s defense and that he had concluded that the defense lacked substance and credibility. The district court abused its discretion by deferring any meaningful investigation into the juror’s bias until he was needed on the regular panel. And its belated inquiry did not confirm that the juror could set aside the bias he previously expressed or that continued exposure to the defense theory would not revive it. The juror’s resulting participation in the USA V. COLAR 5 verdict was structural error. We reverse and remand for a new trial. 1 I. BACKGROUND In 2017, Colar co-founded a nonprofit that provided transitional housing and support services for individuals seeking reentry into independent living. Colar allegedly used stolen identities to rent homes for the nonprofit and submitted fraudulent Paycheck Protection Program loan applications on behalf of the nonprofit and two shell corporations. The government tried Colar for 44 federal offenses, including bank fraud, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, obstruction of official proceedings, and witness tampering. Colar waived his right to counsel, representing himself with the assistance of standby counsel. A. Voir Dire and the First Colloquy Colar, who is a Black man and a Muslim, conducted his own voir dire. He asked prospective jurors if anyone believed that “law enforcement has a history of persecuting black religious organizations.” During jury selection on a Friday, Juror 48 actively participated in voir dire, answering questions about his experiences with law enforcement, providing clarifying answers about his ability to be impartial, and asking questions about the trial process. When Colar asked Juror 48 if he believed that law enforcement was trustworthy “in the world today that we’re living in,” Juror 1 Colar also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. In a concurrently filed memorandum disposition, we affirm the district court’s denial of Colar’s motion for acquittal. See United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Even though we reverse that conviction, we must address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting it, for if the evidence were insufficient, retrial is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.”). We do not reach the remaining issues on appeal. 6 USA V. COLAR 48 responded that “you can’t compare the today times with that of Martin Luther King, Junior . . . . Back then it was much more vicious.” Colar then closed by framing his defense in terms of government corruption and racial targeting. He told the jury that they would hear things from the prosecution about “Your Black Muslim Bakery or Muslims” because “when you have someone in the community that’s trying to help the community . . . law enforcement will turn everything around and paint a different picture about that individual . . . .” Juror 48 was selected as the first of four alternates. Shortly after taking the oath, he asked to speak with the court. He began by saying, “I was hoping this wasn’t going to be an issue because I stayed engaged
Sources
- Official opinionPrimary record
Public record. Timeline facts only; no accusation of wrongdoing. Advisory citizen opinion does not form a citizen mandate.