9th Circuit upholds jury verdict against Oregon prisoner who claimed prison officials were deliberately indifferent…
Townsend v. Bowser
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9th Circuit upholds jury verdict against Oregon prisoner who claimed prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety after a gang assault.
Why it matters
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Henry Townsend's motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury ruled against him in his civil rights lawsuit. Townsend, an Oregon state prisoner, argued that prison officials violated his constitutional rights by returning him to a housing unit where he had previously been assaulted by Paisas gang members. The court found that a reasonable jury could have concluded the threat had dissipated and that officials had taken reasonable steps to protect him, so the verdict stood.
Who it affects
This ruling directly affects Henry Townsend and the Oregon prison officials named in his lawsuit. More broadly, it reflects the standards that apply to prisoners in the Ninth Circuit who bring constitutional claims of deliberate indifference to safety against prison staff.
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Decision issued Jul 20, 2026
Unpublished opinion
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- Decision issued Jul 20, 2026Unpublished opinion
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Jul 20, 2026 · Unpublished opinion
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DEEPER READ
Henry Alexander Townsend, an Oregon state prisoner, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claiming that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his safety after he was assaulted by members of the Paisas gang and then returned to the same housing unit. After a jury trial, the jury ruled in favor of the prison officials. Townsend then asked the court to set aside the verdict through a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, which the district court denied. He appealed that denial to the Ninth Circuit. The legal question was whether the evidence at trial was so one-sided that no reasonable jury could have ruled for the prison officials. The court explained that such a motion can only succeed when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the winning party, points to only one reasonable conclusion that is opposite to what the jury decided. Courts reviewing such motions cannot second-guess witness credibility or reweigh evidence. To win a deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must show both that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm contrary to basic standards of decency, and that prison officials actually knew about that risk and disregarded it. The Ninth Circuit found that the trial evidence supported the jury's verdict on both points. Testimony showed that housing unit populations change rapidly, sometimes by half the residents in a single month, so a jury could reasonably conclude the threat from specific gang members had dissipated before Townsend was returned. Additionally, evidence showed that Paisas is the largest security threat group in the Oregon prison system with members at every facility, making total separation extremely difficult. Officials had also placed Townsend in separate administrative housing between the assaults, which a jury could view as a reasonable protective step. The court was unanimous in affirming the lower court's ruling. There was no dissent noted in the opinion. Because this decision is marked as not for publication, it does not serve as binding legal precedent for future cases in the Ninth Circuit except in limited circumstances defined by court rules.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT HENRY ALEXANDER TOWNSEND, No. 25-147 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:19-cv-01674-AB v. MEMORANDUM* TROY BOWSER, Superintendent; JOHN RUMSEY, Security; NAIMA N. CHAMBERS, STM, Lt.; CAMERON BAUER, STM; ANN AMSBERRY, Supt.; GREGORY JONES, Office of Population Management; KEVIN JACKSON, Assistant Supt. Security, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Amy M. Baggio, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 15, 2026** Before: McKEOWN, OWENS, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Oregon state prisoner Henry Alexander Townsend appeals pro se from the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). district court’s denial of his renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following a jury trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to safety. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291, and we affirm. The district court properly denied Townsend’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. A motion for judgment as a matter of law is properly granted when “the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, permits only one reasonable conclusion, and that conclusion is contrary to the jury’s verdict.” Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1021 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In making this determination, the district court “considers all of the evidence in the record, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party” and “may not make any credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence.” Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. Hendrixlicensing.com Ltd., 762 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2014). A prison official violates a constitutional duty to protect a person in custody when (1) that person is subject to a “substantial risk of serious harm” that is “contrary to current standards of decency,” and (2) the official “acted, subjectively, with ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754, 766 (9th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). To show the subjective component, a plaintiff must “allege that officials ‘kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an 2 25-147 excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 767 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Defendants, a reasonable jury could have found that Townsend failed to show that he was subjected to a “substantial risk of serious harm” and that Defendants were subjectively aware of the risk. Townsend argues that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference in returning him to Housing Unit 6 after he had previously been assaulted by members of the Paisas gang. But as the district court observed, evidence at trial indicated that the population within housing units is in constant flux, and indeed “a unit could change over . . . by half of the population in a month.” A reasonable jury could have inferred that the threat to Townsend had dissipated before he was returned to the housing unit where he had previously been attacked or that Defendants believed the threat to have dissipated. In addition, testimony suggested that it is “virtually impossible for groups not to intermix,” and that Paisas is the largest security threat group in the Oregon Department of Corrections with members “at every facility.” A reasonable jury could have inferred that Defendants, who placed Townsend in separated administrative housing between assaults, even took reasonable steps to protect him. Because we do not find that the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion which is contrary to the jury’s verdict, we hold that the district court 3 25-147 properly denied Townsend’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, and that his other claims are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. 4 25-147
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