9th Circuit rules a law firm's court filing served only on a debtor's lawyers, not…
Nolan v. Porter Kiakona Kopper, LLP
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9th Circuit rules a law firm's court filing served only on a debtor's lawyers, not the debtor herself, cannot be the basis of a federal debt collection lawsuit.
Why it matters
The Ninth Circuit affirmed a Hawaii district court ruling in favor of law firm Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, LLP. Maureen Nolan had sued the firm under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and for intentional infliction of emotional distress after it filed a counter-complaint against her during debt collection proceedings. The court held that because the counter-complaint was served only on Nolan's attorneys and not on Nolan herself, it was not an actionable communication under the FDCPA, and the filing was not outrageous enough to support an emotional distress claim.
Who it affects
This ruling primarily affects consumers who believe debt collectors have violated the FDCPA through court filings, and it clarifies that law firms and other debt collectors are not liable under the FDCPA for filings served only on a debtor's attorney rather than on the debtor directly.
What happens next
Current
Decision issued Jul 15, 2026
Unpublished opinion
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- Decision issued Jul 15, 2026Unpublished opinion
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Jul 15, 2026 · Unpublished opinion
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DEEPER READ
Maureen Nolan appealed after the district court denied her motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to law firm Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, LLP. The firm had been collecting a debt on behalf of a homeowners association and filed a counter-complaint against Nolan during that process. Nolan argued the firm violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and also committed intentional infliction of emotional distress. On the FDCPA claim, the court explained that while the FDCPA does apply to attorneys who regularly collect consumer debts, it does not cover communications directed only to a debtor's attorney, as long as those communications are not accompanied by any threat to contact the debtor directly. The court found the counter-complaint was served exclusively on Nolan's attorneys through an electronic filing system, and Nolan herself was not listed as a recipient. Nolan argued that electronically filing a document makes it available to the entire public, but the court rejected this reasoning, drawing a distinction between who actually receives a communication and who can theoretically access it. On the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, the court applied Hawaii law, which requires conduct to be outrageous, meaning without just cause and beyond all bounds of decency. The court agreed with the district court that the counter-complaint had just cause because it was compulsory under Hawaii court rules, and Nolan offered no reasonable basis to conclude that PMK's actions crossed the line into outrageous conduct. The panel of three judges unanimously affirmed the lower court. No dissent is noted in the opinion. The court designated the opinion as not for publication and not as binding precedent, except as allowed by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 15 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAUREEN NOLAN, No. 25-1357 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 1:23-cv-00271-SASP-WRP v. MEMORANDUM* PORTER KIAKONA KOPPER, LLP, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii Shanlyn A. S. Park, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted June 22, 2026 Honolulu, Hawaii Before: N.R. SMITH, MILLER, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges. Plaintiff-Appellant Maureen Nolan appeals the district court’s order denying her motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellant Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, LLP (“PMK”) on her claims arising out of the law firm’s debt collection efforts on behalf of the Association of Apartment Owners at Mokuleia Sands. We have jurisdiction under * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Bros. Mkt. LLC No. 2 v. United States, 172 F.4th 758, 764 (9th Cir. 2026). There is a genuine dispute of material fact when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 1. The district court correctly determined that PMK’s filing of the counter- complaint is not actionable under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). While the FDCPA applies to the actions of attorneys who regularly engage in consumer-debt-collection activity, see Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 299 (1995), “communications directed only to a debtor’s attorney . . . are not actionable under the [FDCPA]” so long as they are “unaccompanied by any threat to contact the debtor,” Guerrero v. RJM Acquisitions LLC, 499 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). This rule arises from the “FDCPA’s purpose of protecting unsophisticated consumers” and applies equally to “legal pleading[s].” Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2010). The counter-complaint here is not actionable because it was served solely on Nolan’s attorneys via Hawai‘i’s Judiciary Electronic Filing and Service System. The certificate of service reads, “I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was duly served upon the following parties,” and lists only Nolan’s attorneys—and not Nolan herself—as the recipients. Although Nolan contends that 2 25-1357 by publicly filing the counter-complaint electronically, PMK has “published [it] to the entire world,” her argument runs afoul of Guerrero by removing the distinction between those who receive the communication and those who can access it. See 499 F.3d at 936–40 (holding that settlement letter was not actionable under FDCPA where it was delivered only to attorney and not to debtor, even though Hawai‘i Rules of Professional Conduct require that attorneys share settlement offers with their clients, see Haw. R. Pro. Conduct 1.4 (1994)); see also Donohue, 592 F.3d at 1032 (explaining that FDCPA applied to complaint filed by debt collector because debtor was “personally served with the [c]omplaint” and was “[t]herefore . . . the recipient of the communication”). The district court, therefore, did not err either in granting summary judgment to PMK, or in denying partial summary judgment to Nolan, on her FDCPA claims. 2. The district court correctly granted summary judgment as to Nolan’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because she did not raise a genuine issue of material fact over whether PMK’s filing of the counter-complaint was “outrageous.” See Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 537 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Enoka v. AIG Haw. Ins. Co., 128 P.3d 850, 872 (Haw. 2006)). Hawai‘i courts construe the term “outrageous” to mean “without just cause or excuse and beyond all bounds of decency.” Enoka, 128 P.3d at 872 (citation omitted). As the district court noted, not only was there “just cause” because the counterclaim was 3 25-1357 compulsory under Hawai‘i law, see Haw. R. Civ. P. 13(a), but Nolan has offered no reasonable basis to find that the actions taken, or numbers quoted, by PMK have gone “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” Enoka, 128 P.3d at 872 (citation omitted). AFFIRMED. 4 25-1357
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