9th Circuit denies Russian man's petition to reopen deportation case, ruling he waited too long…
Popov v. Blanche
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9th Circuit denies Russian man's petition to reopen deportation case, ruling he waited too long and did not show the diligence required for extra time.
Why it matters
The Ninth Circuit denied Igor Popov's petition to review a Board of Immigration Appeals decision that upheld the denial of his motion to reopen his removal case. Popov, a Russian citizen who had been ordered removed in 2015, waited more than nine years before seeking to reopen his case, and the court found the agency did not abuse its discretion in concluding he had not diligently pursued his rights. The court also declined to second-guess the agency's decision not to reopen the case on its own initiative.
Who it affects
This ruling directly affects immigrants who seek to reopen removal cases long after a final order, particularly those relying on state court vacaturs of old convictions. It reinforces that such individuals must show consistent, documented efforts to pursue their legal options or risk being denied the extra time needed to file.
What happens next
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Decision issued Jul 14, 2026
Unpublished opinion
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- Decision issued Jul 14, 2026Unpublished opinion
- Possible rehearingParties can ask the same court to reconsider.
- Possible Supreme Court petitionThe Supreme Court takes only a small share of petitions.
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Jul 14, 2026 · Unpublished opinion
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DEEPER READ
Igor Popov is a Russian citizen and former lawful permanent resident who was ordered removed from the United States in January 2015 based on convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude. More than nine years later, in 2024, he filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings after a California court vacated his convictions under a state law that allows people to challenge convictions when they were not properly informed of the immigration consequences. The central legal question was whether the 90-day deadline for filing a motion to reopen should be extended, a concept known as equitable tolling. To qualify for equitable tolling, a person must show two things: that they diligently pursued their rights, and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented them from filing on time. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals found that Popov did not act with sufficient diligence. He did not challenge his removal in 2015, took no steps to challenge his conviction in the years after the relevant California law took effect in 2017, and provided only vague claims about being in Russia and lacking money for legal help, without any supporting evidence. The Ninth Circuit, reviewing the agency's decision for abuse of discretion, agreed with the agency. The court measured Popov's diligence starting from when he received notice that something was wrong, and found the record supported the conclusion that he was insufficiently active in pursuing his case. The court acknowledged it might have weighed the circumstances differently, but said that is not the standard, and the agency did not abuse its discretion. Popov also asked the court to review whether the agency should have reopened the case on its own, without a motion from him. The court said its ability to review that kind of discretionary agency decision is very narrow, limited to cases where the agency wrongly believed the law prevented it from acting. That was not the situation here, so the court declined to disturb that decision either. The petition was denied. No dissent was noted in the opinion.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 14 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT IGOR POPOV, No. 25-2185 Agency No. Petitioner, A072-940-428 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Argued and Submitted June 10, 2026 Pasadena, California Before: BYBEE, COLLINS, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Igor Popov, a native and citizen of Russia and former lawful permanent resident, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his motion for reconsideration of the IJ’s denial of his motion to reopen. The IJ had denied Popov’s motion to reopen as untimely. “We review the denial of a motion to * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. reconsider for abuse of discretion.” B.R. v. Garland, 26 F.4th 827, 835 (9th Cir. 2022). We likewise review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Cano-Merida v. INS, 311 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 2002). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition. 1. A motion to reopen must generally be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); Hernandez-Ortiz v. Garland, 32 F.4th 794, 800 (9th Cir. 2022). Here, Popov was ordered removed in January 2015 based on his convictions for crimes of moral turpitude, but he did not move to reopen his removal proceedings until more than nine years later. Therefore, Popov’s motion is timely only if the deadline is equitably tolled. See Hernandez-Ortiz, 32 F.4th at 801. Popov claims that the agency erred in denying him equitable tolling because he moved to reopen within 90 days of a California court order under Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1) vacating his convictions. That California law allows “[a] person who is no longer in criminal custody” to “file a motion to vacate a conviction or sentence” on the ground that “[t]he conviction or sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence.” Cal. Penal Code § 1473.7(a)(1); see Bent v. Garland, 115 F.4th 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2024). 2 25-2185 “A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Bent, 115 F.4th at 941 (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 634 (2010)). “In assessing a petitioner’s diligence, we ‘consider the petitioner’s overall level of care and caution in light of his or her particular circumstances.’” Id. at 943 (quoting Smith v. Davis, 953 F.3d 582, 599 (9th Cir. 2020)). In this case, the agency did not commit any error of fact or law in determining that Popov did not act diligently in moving to reopen, and it adequately considered Popov’s personal circumstances. “‘[W]e measure a petitioner’s diligence from the date’ on which ‘a reasonable person in the petitioner’s position is put on notice that something was wrong,’” which is “the date that [the petitioner] received the [notice to appear].” Id. at 942 (quoting Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir. 2011)) (alterations omitted). As the IJ observed, Popov did not challenge his removal in 2015, or at any point until he filed his motion to reopen in 2024. Further, in the approximately three years after 2017—when § 1473.7(a)(1) went into effect— Popov made no apparent efforts to vacate his conviction. While Popov argues that he was located in Russia and lacked financial resources to afford legal assistance until late 2020, the IJ correctly noted nothing in the record demonstrated that Popov took any “steps on his own to challenge his conviction or removal order.” The IJ 3 25-2185 fairly observed that Popov did not “provide any details or evidence to support his vague suggestion that he lacked sufficient financial resources.” The IJ also reasonably concluded that Popov’s efforts after obtaining legal assistance did not reflect sufficient diligence. Regardless of whether we would have weighed the circumstances differently, we cannot say that the agency abused its discretion. 2. Popov also argues that the agency erred in declining to exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings. However, our review on this issue “is limited to those situations where it is obvious that the agency has denied sua sponte relief not as a matter of discretion, but because it erroneously believed that the law forbade it from exercising its discretion or that exercising its discretion would be futile.” Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1234 (9th Cir. 2020) (internal citations omitted). That is not the case here. PETITION DENIED. 4 25-2185
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