9th Circuit denied most of Jose Huazo-Marroquin's immigration claims but sent his case back to…

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOSE MANUEL HUAZO-MARROQUIN, No. 20-71227 Petitioner, Agency No. A205-671-653 v. MEMORANDUM* TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted June 30, 2026** Before: GOULD, RAWLINSON, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge VANDYKE. Petitioner Jose Manuel Huazo-Marroquin (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for vacatur of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision dismissing the appeal of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order denying Petitioner’s applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Petitioner also challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand to consider cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny in part and grant in part, and remand. 1. We review the denial of applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial evidence. Sharma v. Garland, 9 F.4th 1052, 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2021). The substantial evidence standard is deferential, allowing reversal only when “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Tzompantzi-Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 703 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)). We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen or remand for abuse of discretion. Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Partap v. Holder, 603 F.3d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (analogizing motions to reopen with motions to remand). “The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to the law, and when it fails to provide a reasoned explanation for its actions.” Tadevosyan v. Holder, 743 F.3d 1250, 1252–53 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Petitioner’s 2 20-71227 applications for withholding of removal and relief under CAT.1 “[W]ithholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3) … prohibits removal to a country where the noncitizen’s ‘life or freedom would be threatened’ on account of his ‘race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’” Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). Petitioner argues that he is a member of two proposed particular social groups (“PSGs”): “Mexicans who are perceived as wealthy because of their years residing in the U.S.” or “individuals who have spent a lengthy period in the U.S.” The agency properly concluded that neither group is a socially-distinct group in Mexican society and that our caselaw has rejected similarly broad PSGs as not legally cognizable. See Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (holding that PSG “returning Mexicans from the United States,” was “too broad to qualify as a cognizable social group”); Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (rejecting “imputed wealthy Americans” as a PSG); Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 2019) (rejecting “individuals ‘returning to Mexico [from] the United States [who] are believed to be wealthy’” as a PSG). To establish protection under CAT, a petitioner must show that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed.” Akosung v. Barr, 970 1 Because Petitioner did not challenge the IJ’s denial of asylum before the BIA, we do not have jurisdiction to consider that issue on appeal. See Cortez-Acosta v. INS, 234 F.3d 476, 480 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 20-71227 F.3d 1095, 1104 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2)). And, the torture must be with the consent or acquiescence of a public official. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Petitioner did not meet his burden to show that he will “more likely than not” suffer future torture if returned to Mexico. Petitioner testified that two of his cousins were kidnapped and tortured in 2010 but did not point to any specific instances of violence against Petitioner or his family since then. Although the agency found that Petitioner’s testimony and the country conditions data supported a possibility of torture, the evidence does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner is “more likely than not” to suffer torture if returned to Mexico. 3. The BIA abused its discretion when it denied Petitioner’s motion to remand to adjudicate cancellation of removal. Petitioner contends that the BIA relied on an interpretation of the “stop-time-rule” that is no longer viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198 (2018); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) & (d)(1)(A). We agree with Petitioner. The BIA erred in relying on Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez & Capula-Cortes, 27 I&N Dec. 520 (BIA 2019) for the proposition that a subsequent notice to appear specifying the time and/or place of a hearing can perfect a previously deficient notice because that decision is contradicted by the text of the statute and has since been overruled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A) (“[A]ny period of continuous residence 4 20-71227 or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . except . . . when the alien is served a notice to appear[.]” (emphasis added)); Niz- Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155, 158–69 (2021) (holding that a “notice to appear” sufficient to trigger the time-stop rule must be contained in a single document); see also Lopez v. Garland, 998 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 2021) (en banc); Posos-Sanchez v. Garland, 3 F.4th 1176, 1184–86 (9th Cir. 2021); Quebrado Cantor v. Garland, 17 F. 4th 869, 871 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Matter of M-F-O-, 28 I&N Dec. 408, 416 n.3 (BIA 2021) (overruling Matter of Mendoza-Hernandez & Capula-Cortes). Nor are we persuaded that the BIA gave a “reasoned explanation” regarding Petitioner’s prima facie eligibility. Tadevosyan, 743 F.3d at 1253. Although the BIA reasoned that a concern about Petitioner’s son did not show “exceptional or extremely unusual hardship,” it is unclear to which son the BIA was referring in this sentence and unclear whether the BIA considered all evidence as to Petitioner’s sons and wife. The BIA abused its discretion by denying the motion to remand on the issue of cancellation of removal without giving a “reasoned explanation” evaluating Petitioner’s prima facie eligibility. Id. We grant the petition solely as to Petitioner’s cancellation of removal claim and remand to the BIA for further proceedings on this issue consistent with this disposition. DENIED IN PA

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