8th Circuit upholds order blocking a landlord from evicting a Missouri dairy that leases farmland…
La Belle Dairy, LLC v. Sharpe Holdings, Inc.
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8th Circuit upholds order blocking a landlord from evicting a Missouri dairy that leases farmland, ruling the court had jurisdiction and the landlord waived its due process objections.
Why it matters
The Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court order preventing Sharpe Holdings from evicting La Belle Dairy from thousands of acres of leased farmland in Northeast Missouri. The court first determined it had jurisdiction, finding that the order labeled a 'temporary restraining order' actually functioned as a preliminary injunction because it had no expiration date and lasted more than 28 days. The court then rejected Sharpe's argument that it was denied due process, finding that Sharpe waived that objection by never raising it below and by acting throughout the proceedings as if a preliminary injunction was under consideration.
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Decision issued Jul 23, 2026
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Jul 23, 2026 · Published opinion
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La Belle Dairy leases thousands of acres of forage land in Northeast Missouri from Sharpe Holdings to grow feed for its cattle and manage waste under a government-mandated nutrient management plan. After La Belle Dairy sued Sharpe for breach of their lease, Sharpe threatened to evict the dairy. La Belle Dairy asked the district court for emergency relief, and the court issued an order, labeled a 'temporary restraining order,' blocking Sharpe from evicting or interfering with the dairy's possession of the land pending a further ruling on a preliminary injunction. Before reaching the merits, the Eighth Circuit had to decide whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Courts can review preliminary injunctions but generally cannot review temporary restraining orders. The court concluded that despite its label, the district court's order functioned as a preliminary injunction in practical effect. Two factors were key: the order had no expiration date and remained in place indefinitely, and it had already been in effect for more than 28 days when Sharpe appealed, which exceeded the standard outer limit for temporary restraining orders under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the order had the practical effect of a preliminary injunction, the Eighth Circuit found it had jurisdiction to review it. Sharpe's main argument on appeal was that the district court violated its due process rights by entering what amounted to a preliminary injunction without adequate notice or a fair opportunity to respond. Sharpe pointed out that the hearing notice and La Belle Dairy's proposed order mentioned only a temporary restraining order, that only six days' notice was given, that no testimony was taken, that no discovery had occurred, and that Sharpe had no chance to cross-examine witnesses whose declarations were submitted with the motion. The court rejected this argument, finding that Sharpe waived or at minimum forfeited the objection. Sharpe never raised these concerns with the district court during the proceedings. It submitted its own documentary evidence in response, participated in the hearing using 'preliminary injunction phraseology,' acknowledged more than once that the relief might last for years, and apparently ignored La Belle Dairy's invitations to schedule a formal preliminary injunction hearing. The court also noted that Sharpe's briefs appeared to disclaim the value of an evidentiary hearing while simultaneously asking for one on appeal, which undercut its position. The court concluded that if Sharpe believed more process was needed, it was Sharpe's responsibility to seek it rather than avoid it. The ruling affirms the injunction and leaves La Belle Dairy in possession of the leased farmland while the underlying breach of contract dispute continues in the district court. The decision also reinforces the principle that courts look to the practical effect of an order, not just its label, when deciding whether appellate jurisdiction exists.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-1803 ___________________________ La Belle Dairy, LLC lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee v. Sharpe Holdings, Inc.; Charles N. Sharpe, Jr. Foundation lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellants ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - Hannibal ____________ Submitted: April 14, 2026 Filed: July 23, 2026 ____________ Before KELLY, ARNOLD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. ____________ ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. As its name suggests, La Belle Dairy, LLC, owns a dairy in Northeast Missouri near the town of La Belle. For years it has leased thousands of acres of forage land next to the dairy from Sharpe Holdings, Inc., and its successor in interest, the Charles N. Sharpe, Jr. Foundation (for simplicity, we will refer to them in the singular as “Sharpe”), so it can grow food for the dairy’s cattle and properly dispose of their waste according to its government-mandated nutrient management plan. After La Belle Dairy sued Sharpe in the district court1 claiming that Sharpe had breached the parties’ lease, Sharpe responded by accusing La Belle Dairy of a breach of its own and threatened to initiate legal action to evict it from the land. La Belle Dairy in turn asked the district court to enjoin Sharpe from carrying out its threat, and the district court agreed to do so. Sharpe appeals the court’s decision. We affirm. Before addressing Sharpe’s contentions, we need to make sure that we have jurisdiction over this appeal even though the parties both say we do. See Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 566 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2009). We have jurisdiction to review a district court’s interlocutory order granting a preliminary injunction, see Choreo, LLC v. Lors, 164 F.4th 667, 669 (8th Cir. 2026) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)), but jurisdiction does not extend to a court’s grant of a temporary restraining order. See In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1026 (8th Cir. 2020). Here, La Belle Dairy filed what it called a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. In its motion, La Belle Dairy asked the district court to enter a temporary restraining order followed by a preliminary injunction enjoining Sharpe from interfering with its possession of the leased premises. The district court then entered an order scheduling a hearing on La Belle Dairy’s “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.” The day after the court conducted that hearing, it granted La Belle Dairy a “temporary restraining order” stating that pending its “issuance of a ruling with respect to Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction,” Sharpe was enjoined from evicting or otherwise interfering with La Belle Dairy’s possession of the leased premises. 1 The Honorable Henry Edward Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. -2- Though the district court appears at first blush to have issued an unreviewable temporary restraining order, courts have recognized that the label affixed to the top of an order does not control whether it is a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order. See Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 594 (2018). Whatever it might be called, what matters is whether the order has the “practical effect” of granting an injunction. See id. We think the order here, despite its label, has the practical effect of granting an injunction, and so we have jurisdiction to review it. For one thing, the order was in effect for more than 28 days when Sharpe filed its notice of appeal challenging it. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(2), temporary restraining orders issued without notice to the adverse party can last up to 28 days unless the adverse party consents to a longer extension. Though the order here was issued with notice to the adverse party, in practice courts often view orders exceeding the length of time set out in Rule 65(b)(2) as having the practical effect of a preliminary injunction. See Quinn v. Missouri, 839 F.2d 425, 426 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); see also H-D Mich., LLC v. Hellenic Duty Free Shops S.A., 694 F.3d 827, 844–45 (7th Cir. 2012). In addition, the order here didn’t contain an expiration date: It was open-ended, saying it would remain in effect pending a ruling on La Belle Dairy’s request for a preliminary injunction. We encountered a similarly worded order in Nordin v. Nutri/Sys., Inc., 897 F.2d 339, 341–43 (8th Cir. 1990), and concluded that it was in substance a preliminary injunction and thus appealable. We reach the same conclusion here. Assured of our jurisdiction, we turn to Sharpe’s contentions. First, it asserts that the district court entered what was in practical effect a preliminary injunction without giving Sharpe adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard, in violation of Sharpe’s right to due process. More specifically, it takes issue with the court’s entering a preliminary injunction even though La Belle Dairy’s proposed order and the court’s notice of hearing mentioned only a temporary restraining order, not to -3- mention that the court gave a mere six days’ notice of the hearing. At the hearing, the district court heard arguments from counsel, but neither side presented testimony or other evidence. Sharpe asserts that it wasn’t given a fair opportunity to challenge the evidence La Belle Dairy submitted in support of its motion (such as by cross- examining a witness who submitted declarations attached to the motion) or to conduct any discovery. In sum, Sharpe says, had it “known that the hearing was for a preliminary injunction, it may have proceeded differently, by seeking discovery (as no discovery had been exchanged), requesting an evidentiary hearing, and/or presenting additional evidence.” The difficulty for Sharpe is that it waived, or at least forfeited, this contention. At no point did it raise its concerns to the district court, and it challenged La Belle Dairy’s documentary evidence with its own when it submitted its response to the motion. Sharpe also proceeded as if it understood that a preliminary injunction was under consideration at the hearing, as it recognized more than once that the relief awarded might last for years. It further admits that the parties used “preliminary injunction phraseology” at the hearing. Even more, Sharpe appears to have ignored overtures from La Belle Dairy’s attorney about scheduling a preliminary-injunction hearing. It appears as well in its briefing to disclaim the value of an evidentiary hearing (on the ground that the district court’s mind was already made up) even though a hearing is the very relief it’s asking for. So it seems that Sharpe made a conscious decision not to seek more process before the district court and has waived its challenge. Sharpe says that it shouldn’t be expected to seek a hearing when it was La Belle Dairy who sought preliminary relief. The burden of proof on the merits of La Belle Dairy’s request for preliminary relief, however, is beside the point when it is Sharpe who is arguing that the district court didn’t give it an adequate opportunity to respond to La Belle Dairy’s request. If Sharpe thought more process was needed, it was incumbent on Sharpe not to avoid it or disclaim it.
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