8th Circuit dismisses Liberty Mutual's appeal of a remand order, finding it lacks jurisdiction to…

Record source: CourtListener

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-2377 ___________________________ G.T. Plaintiff - Appellee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company Defendant - Appellant James McLaurie Defendant - Appellee Susan McLaurie, By and through Defendant Ad Litem Blake I. Markus Defendant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis ____________ Submitted: January 13, 2026 Filed: July 17, 2026 ____________ Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge. G.T. sued Liberty Mutual and James and Susan McLaurie (the McLauries) in state court to collect on a prior judgment that G.T. obtained against the McLauries. After Liberty Mutual removed the case to federal district court based on diversity of citizenship, James McLaurie joined G.T.’s motion to remand. The district court 1 granted James McLaurie’s motion, finding that his request signified that the defendants did not unanimously consent to removal. Liberty Mutual now appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. I. On May 3, 2023, G.T. sued James and Susan McLaurie2 in Missouri state court for the physical and sexual abuse she endured while under their care when she was 3-4 years old (the Underlying Litigation). G.T. ultimately prevailed following a bench trial, obtaining a judgment of $150,000,000 against each of the McLauries. On January 17, 2025, G.T. sued the McLauries again in Missouri state court, along with Liberty Mutual, the McLauries’ homeowner’s insurer, seeking to collect on the prior judgment. G.T. brought claims of equitable garnishment against all three parties and claims of bad faith, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty against Liberty Mutual. On January 31, 2025, Liberty Mutual removed the case to the Eastern District of Missouri on the basis of diversity of citizenship. James McLaurie had not been served at this time, but he voluntarily entered his appearance on February 21, 2025. On March 11th, G.T. moved to remand the case, arguing that the parties were not 1 The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. 2 Susan McLaurie died on August 1, 2022, approximately nine months before G.T. filed her May 2023 lawsuit. The state court appointed attorney Blake I. Markus as a defendant ad litem to represent her. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.021(1). -2- diverse. On March 13th, James McLaurie, rather than joining Liberty Mutual’s Notice of Removal, instead joined G.T.’s motion to remand, reiterating G.T.’s contention that the parties were not diverse. Susan McLaurie also did not join Liberty Mutual’s Notice of Removal. The district court denied G.T.’s motion to remand without prejudice but granted James McLaurie’s motion to remand. While the district court disagreed with G.T.’s contention that the parties were not diverse, it found that James McLaurie’s decision to join G.T.’s motion to remand signified a lack of unanimity among the defendants. The district court noted that a lack of unanimity generally renders a removal “defective,” because under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A), “[w]hen a civil action is removed solely [for diversity of citizenship], all defendants . . . must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” The district court then explained that even though Liberty Mutual removed the case prior to James McLaurie entering his appearance, under 28 U.S.C. § 1448, McLaurie had a right to “veto” the removal after he joined the case as a defendant. Therefore, according to the district court, because McLaurie joined G.T.’s motion to remand after entering his appearance, “there is no unanimity among the defendants as to removal,” and it remanded the case. Liberty Mutual now appeals, asserting that remand was improper. II. First, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Generally, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” “Congress has decided that in the ordinary case the federal district court should have the final word on removal since at some point litigation over the choice of a courtroom must end.” Vasseur v. Sowell, 930 F.3d 994, 996 (8th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “This congressional judgment makes perfect sense[,] for [t]he only thing that is at stake is the forum that will hear a claim, and this issue is not so fundamental that a second or third layer of judges must test its correctness.” Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). -3-  Section 1447(d)’s general bar on reviewability applies to remand orders that are “based on grounds specified in § 1447(c).” Stone v. J & M Sec., LLC, 55 F.4th 1150, 1152 (8th Cir. 2022). The grounds specified in § 1447(c) are (1) “a timely raised defect in removal procedure” and (2) “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995) (citing § 1447(c)). Here, because the district court did not grant remand based on a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, we need only determine whether the district court based its order on a “defect” as contemplated by § 1447(c). Id. While “[§] 1447(c) . . . do[es] not define what constitutes a ‘defect,’” we have agreed with previous courts who have “construed the statute ‘to mean removals that were defective in terms of the statutory conditions that Congress had placed on removal.’” Graphic Commc’ns Loc. 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp., 636 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Meanwhile, non-statutory grounds for granting remand—such as judicial abstention and crowded dockets—have not generally been characterized as “defect[s]” in removal procedure under § 1447(c). See id. (noting that “removals based on abstention, among other doctrines, [have been] held to be outside the scope of [§ 1447(c)]”); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006). However, a district court’s ground for remand need not perfectly match § 1447(c)’s definition of a “defect” to be shielded from review—it need only be “colorable.” Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007). Because “the line between misclassifying a ground [for remand] . . . and misapplying a proper ground [for remand] is sometimes elusively thin,” “review of the District Court’s characterization of its remand as resting upon [§ 1447(c)] . . . should be limited to confirming that that characterization was colorable.” Id. Determining whether a remand order is “colorabl[y]” based on § 1447(c) is more of a subjective test than an objective one. See id. The critical question is not -4- whether the district court properly invoked § 1447(c) in ordering remand, but rather whether it “believed” that it was doing so. See Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 119 F.3d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1997). In other words, so long as a remand order is issued “pursuant to § 1447(c),”

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