8th Circuit upholds 60-month supervised release revocation sentence for Salean, finding no clear error in…
United States v. Saladean Salean
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8th Circuit upholds 60-month supervised release revocation sentence for Salean, finding no clear error in the judge's sentencing reasoning after he shot someone while on supervised release.
Why it matters
The Eighth Circuit affirmed a 60-month revocation sentence imposed on Saladean Salean, who violated his supervised release by shooting someone in the leg shortly after getting out of prison. Salean argued the district court wrongly considered factors that are off-limits for revocation sentences, but because he never raised that objection at his hearing, he faced the harder task of proving a clear and obvious error. The court found no such clear error, partly because recent Supreme Court precedent leaves open whether retribution-related considerations are permissible when applied to the supervised release violation itself, as opposed to the original underlying crime.
Who it affects
This ruling directly affects people who are sentenced after violating the conditions of federal supervised release. It also signals to defense attorneys that objections to sentencing reasoning must be raised at the hearing itself, or they become far harder to win on appeal.
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Decision issued Jul 16, 2026
Unpublished opinion
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Jul 16, 2026 · Unpublished opinion
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Saladean Salean was serving supervised release after a prior federal conviction when he shot someone in the leg. He pleaded guilty to a new felon-in-possession charge and also admitted to violating his supervised release conditions. At a combined sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced him to 195 months for the new crime and 60 months for the supervised release violation, with 40 of those months running consecutively, for a total of 235 months in prison. Salean appealed the 60-month revocation portion, arguing that the district court improperly relied on factors that federal law says courts must ignore when sentencing someone for a supervised release violation. Specifically, federal law instructs courts not to consider the seriousness of the underlying offense, promoting respect for the law, or providing just punishment for the offense when crafting a revocation sentence. The district court had expressed concern about how flagrant, violent, and quick the violation was, and cited deterrence, public safety, and the seriousness of repeating a serious federal crime. Because Salean did not object to this reasoning at the sentencing hearing, the appeals court applied a strict standard called plain error review. Under that standard, Salean needed to show that any error was clear and obvious and that it affected both his substantial rights and the fairness of the proceedings. The Eighth Circuit concluded he could not meet that bar. The court noted that the Supreme Court, in a recent case called Esteras v. United States, left open the possibility that retribution-related considerations might be permissible when they relate to the supervised release violation itself, as opposed to the original criminal conviction. Because the law on this point is unsettled, the district court's remarks could not qualify as a clear or obvious error. There was no dissent. Going forward, this ruling illustrates that defendants who do not object to sentencing reasoning at the time of their hearing face a very difficult standard on appeal, and that the line between permissible and impermissible factors in supervised release revocation sentences remains an open legal question following the Supreme Court's Esteras decision.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 24-2869 ___________________________ United States of America Plaintiff - Appellee v. Saladean Walker Salean, also known as Michael Germane Walker Defendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the District of Minnesota ____________ Submitted: February 13, 2026 Filed: July 16, 2026 [Unpublished] ____________ Before LOKEN, L.R. SMITH, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ PER CURIAM. Fresh out of prison, Saladean Salean violated the conditions of supervised release. He now claims an improper factor played a key role in his 60-month revocation sentence. It is not clear or obvious that it did, so we affirm. I. To remain on supervised release, Salean could “not commit another federal, state[,] or local crime.” Yet, according to the government, he did so repeatedly, mostly through illegal possession of ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). As relevant here, after shooting someone in the leg, he both pleaded guilty to a single felon-in-possession count and admitted to violating a condition of supervised release. At a combined sentencing hearing, the district court1 ordered him to spend a total of 235 months in prison, 195 months for the new crime and 60 months for the violation, with 40 to run consecutively to the other sentence. In Salean’s view, the district court made a critical error in punishing him based on the original offense he committed, the one that led to his placement on supervised release. He did not object at the hearing, however, so he cannot prevail unless he identifies “a clear or obvious error that affected his substantial rights and . . . seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”2 United States v. Spotted Bear, 920 F.3d 1199, 1201 (8th Cir. 2019) (first alteration in original) (citation omitted). He has not done so. 1 The Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota. 2 The parties disagree about whether the alleged error was procedural, substantive, or both. The question is largely academic because plain-error review applies either way. See United States v. Higgerson, 166 F.4th 702, 708 (8th Cir. 2026) (applying plain-error review to a “substantive[-]unreasonable[ness]” challenge for “g[iving] considerable weight to an improper sentencing factor” (citation omitted)); United States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Procedural sentencing errors are forfeited, and . . . reviewed only for plain error, if the defendant fails to object in the district court.”). -2- II. When the district court sentenced Salean, it expressed “dismay[]” that “the [supervised-release] violation was so flagrant and so violent and so quick after [he] got out.” (Emphasis added). It was also concerned about “the real danger to the community” that the violation posed. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (instructing courts to consider “the need . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant” at sentencing); id. § 3583(e)(3) (same for a revocation sentence). Based on those considerations, “as well as [to] provide punishment and deterrence and [to] reflect[] . . . respect for the law and the seriousness of the . . . violation,” it gave him a longer sentence “for repeating a very, very serious federal crime.” (Emphasis added); see id. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (discussing the need to “afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”); id. § 3583(e)(3) (same for a revocation sentence). Nothing it said was “clear[ly] or obvious[ly]” out of bounds. Spotted Bear, 920 F.3d at 1201 (citation omitted); see Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 194 n.5 (2025) (leaving open the possibility that a revocation sentence can “sound in retribution for the violation of the conditions of the supervised release”). In arguing otherwise, Salean correctly recognizes that district courts fashioning revocation sentences are supposed to ignore several factors, including “the seriousness of the offense, [promoting] respect for the law, and [providing] just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (emphases added); see Esteras, 606 U.S. at 194 n.5, 197 (explaining that these considerations are “exclude[d]” for revocation sentences with respect to “the underlying criminal conviction”); see also United States v. Newcomer, 164 F.4th 697, 700 (8th Cir. 2026) (recognizing that “offense” in the revocation context does not mean “the violation of the supervised-release conditions” (citing Esteras, 606 U.S. at 193–94)). But as the Supreme Court recently recognized, similar “consideration[s]” may be “permissible” when it comes to the supervised-release violation itself. Esteras, 606 U.S. at 194 n.5; see also id. at 193 (remarking that § 3553(a)(2)(A) “does not speak of retribution generally” (emphasis added)). This possibility means it could not have -3- been a “clear or obvious” error to mention them here.3 Spotted Bear, 920 F.3d at 1201 (citation omitted); see United States v. Fortier, 956 F.3d 563, 570 (8th Cir. 2020) (“Usually, for an error to be plain, it must be in contravention of [controlling] precedent.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). III. We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court. ______________________________ 3 United States v. Hall, 931 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2019), is not to the contrary. Although it treated the factors in § 3553(a)(2)(A) as off-limits in the revocation context, just like Esteras later held, it decided that the district court’s reliance on one of them was too “insignificant” to be a “substantive error.” Id. at 697. -4-
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