8th Circuit upholds 14-month sentence for man whose supervised release was revoked, finding no improper…
United States v. Malcolm Redmon
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8th Circuit upholds 14-month sentence for man whose supervised release was revoked, finding no improper reliance on retribution, but sends one condition back for review.
Why it matters
The Eighth Circuit largely affirmed the revocation of Malcolm Redmon's supervised release and his 14-month prison sentence, finding the district court did not improperly rely on retribution in violation of the Supreme Court's Esteras decision. The court found that Esteras bars judges from considering punishment for the original offense when revoking supervised release, but concluded that bar was not violated here. However, the court sent one supervised release condition back to the district court for further review based on a prior Eighth Circuit ruling about community service limits.
Who it affects
This ruling directly affects people on federal supervised release who are facing revocation proceedings, as it clarifies that judges cannot punish them further for their original offense. It also guides federal district courts and probation officers on the limits of supervised release conditions and revocation sentencing.
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Decision issued Jul 14, 2026
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Jul 14, 2026 · Published opinion
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DEEPER READ
Malcolm Redmon pleaded guilty in 2016 to a drug conspiracy charge and was sentenced to 292 months in prison followed by eight years of supervised release. In January 2025, he received executive clemency and was released, but his supervised release came with conditions including a requirement to live in a residential reentry center for up to 120 days. Within two weeks, the center removed him for violating rules against alcohol and being dismissive toward staff. He then traveled more than 50 miles from his residence without notifying his probation officer, which violated another condition. After a revocation hearing, the district court found two violations, revoked his supervised release, and sentenced him to 14 months, the top of the advisory guidelines range. Redmon appealed, arguing that the district court improperly punished him based on retribution for his original drug offense, which he said violated the Supreme Court's 2025 decision in Esteras v. United States. In Esteras, the Supreme Court held that when a judge revokes or modifies supervised release, the judge cannot consider the sentencing factor that calls for punishment to reflect the seriousness of the offense and provide just punishment. That factor, known as the retribution consideration, is expressly excluded by the federal statute governing supervised release revocation. The Court in Esteras explained that supervised release is meant to serve forward-looking goals like deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation, not to add more punishment for the original crime. The Eighth Circuit reviewed the Esteras standard and applied it to Redmon's case. Because Redmon had not clearly raised the Esteras objection at the district court level, the appeals court applied a demanding plain-error standard of review, meaning it would only reverse if it was clear or obvious that the district court actually relied on the forbidden retribution factor. The court concluded that the district court did not violate Esteras, relying on its own recent decision in United States v. Higgerson and consistent rulings from other federal appeals courts. The 14-month sentence was therefore affirmed. On a separate issue, Redmon argued that one of his supervised release conditions impermissibly authorized more than 400 hours of community service, contrary to the Eighth Circuit's own ruling in United States v. Hinkeldey. The appeals court found Hinkeldey distinguishable but still sent that condition back to the district court for further consideration. The case is otherwise affirmed, meaning Redmon's revocation and prison sentence stand.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________ No. 25-3055 ___________________________ United States of America lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee v. Malcolm Desean Redmon, also known as Malcolm Deshawn Redmon, also known as Malcolm Redmond, also known as Harp lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant ____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City ____________ Submitted: April 16, 2026 Filed: July 14, 2026 ____________ Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge. In 2016, Malcolm Redmon pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him to 292 months imprisonment and eight years supervised release. In January 2025, the President granted Redmon executive clemency and he was ordered to be released from Bureau of Prisons custody on July 16, 2025, with his term of supervised release remaining. He began his term of supervised release that day. Before release, the district court modified his conditions of supervised release to require that he “reside in and satisfactorily participate in a residential reentry center program, until discharged by the center director after consultation with the Probation Office, for a period not to exceed 120 days.” Within two weeks, the residential reentry center terminated Redmon’s participation in its program because he violated the facility’s rules prohibiting alcohol and was dismissive toward staff at a disciplinary meeting. Shortly thereafter, Redmon violated another condition by traveling more than fifty miles from his residence without notifying his probation officer. When arrested, he declined an offer to modify his conditions of supervision, and the Probation Office commenced supervised release revocation proceedings. After a revocation hearing in October 2025, the district court found two grade C violations, revoked supervised release, and sentenced him to 14 months imprisonment, the top of his advisory guidelines range of 8 to 14 months imprisonment. See USSG § 7B1.4(a). Redmon appeals, arguing that his revocation sentence was influenced by retribution for his underlying offense in violation of Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185, 188 (2025), and that his supervised release conditions impermissibly authorize more than 400 hours of community service, contrary to our decision in United States v. Hinkeldey, 124 F.4th 1093, 1094 (8th Cir. 2024). Concluding that the district court did not violate Esteras as construed in United States v. Higgerson, 166 F.4th 702, 707 (8th Cir. 2026), and in decisions of our sister circuits, and that Hinkeldey is distinguishable, we remand for further consideration of the supervised release condition and otherwise affirm. -2- I. The Esteras Issue When a criminal sentence includes a term of supervised release after the defendant has served his prison sentence, and the defendant then violates one or more conditions of supervised release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) provides that the district court “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7),” may “modify, reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term,” or “revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such term.” Excluded from this statutory list is consideration of the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor -- “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.” This is a “retribution” consideration, one of “the four purposes of sentencing generally.” Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 325 (2011); see Esteras, 606 U.S. at 191-93. A. In Esteras, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits over whether the exclusion in § 3583(e) precludes all consideration of the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factor, or whether -- as the government contended -- courts may still consider retributive purpose when revoking supervised release but are not required to do so. Based on the plain meaning of the statute confirmed by statutory structure and its prior decisions including Tapia, the Court held that “courts cannot consider § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking [or modifying] supervised release.” 606 U.S. at 192 n.3, 195 (emphasis added). Section 3553(a)(2), the Court explained, “captures [in subsections (A) to (D)] the traditional heartland of criminal sentencing . . . . considerations [of] retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation [that] are the four purposes of sentencing generally.” Id. at 191. -3- [I]n our current criminal justice scheme . . . supervised release . . . “is not a punishment in lieu of incarceration.” Rather, it “fulfills rehabilitative ends” . . . . So when a defendant violates the conditions of his supervised release, it makes sense that a court must consider the forward-looking ends of sentencing (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation), but may not consider the backward-looking purpose of retribution. Id. at 196 (emphases in original) (citations omitted). Thus, in determining the appropriate supervised release revocation sentence, the court must limit its consideration to “the factors set forth in” the listed subsections in (a)(1), (2), and (4)- (7) of § 3553, which include “the nature and circumstances of the offense” and “the history and characteristics of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(1); and the need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment,” § 3553(a)(2)(B), (C), and (D). “For instance,” the Court explained, “if the defendant’s original offense was particularly violent, that fact might inform the court’s judgment as to whether revocation is necessary ‘to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.’ § 3553(a)(2)(C). But the court could not revoke based on the view that, given the violent nature of the underlying offense, the defendant deserves additional punishment.” Esteras, 606 U.S. at 200. The Court then addressed the dissent’s concern that in applying this rule it will be difficult for appellate courts to determine whether a district court has impermissibly relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A): If the defendant does not make the district court aware that it may be impermissibly relying on § 3553(a)(2)(A), then the defendant’s appeal will be governed by plain-error review. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b). In that event, the district court’s order revoking supervised release -4- and requiring reimprisonment will be affirmed unless it is “clear” or “obvious” that the district court actually relied on § 3553(a)(2)(A) -- because it did so either expressly or by unmistakable im
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