A blind man's disability benefits claim was denied after a second federal review.

Record source: CourtListener

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON RYAN F.,1 Case No. 3:25-cv-01535-SB Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER v. COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. BECKERMAN, U.S. Magistrate Judge. Ryan F. (“Plaintiff”) filed this appeal challenging the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“Commissioner”) denial of his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons explained below, the Court concludes that the Commissioner’s decision is free of harmful legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record. 1 In the interest of privacy, this opinion uses only the first name and the initial of the last name of the non-governmental party. STANDARD OF REVIEW “As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security determinations is limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). A federal court’s review is limited because “[f]or highly fact-intensive individualized determinations like a claimant’s entitlement to disability benefits, Congress places a premium upon agency expertise, and, for the sake of uniformity, it is usually better to minimize the opportunity for reviewing courts to substitute their discretion for that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 621 (1966)). Adhering to this principle, courts “follow three important rules” in reviewing social security determinations. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015). First, courts “leave it to the [agency] to determine credibility, resolve conflicts in the testimony, and resolve ambiguities in the record.” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098). Second, courts “will ‘disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098). Third, if the agency “‘commits legal error, [courts] uphold the decision where that error is harmless,’ meaning that ‘it is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination,’ or that, despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’” Id. (quoting Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1098); see also Smith v. Kijakazi, 14 F.4th 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2021) (“And even where this modest [substantial evidence] burden is not met, [courts] will not reverse an [agency] decision where the error was harmless.” (citing Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds by regulation as recognized in Farlow v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 485, 487 (9th Cir. 2022))). /// BACKGROUND I. PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION Plaintiff was born in October 1980, making him thirty-seven years old on January 15, 2018, his alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 60, 73, 648.) Plaintiff is a high school graduate who has no past relevant work experience. (Id. at 206, 631, 667-68.) In his DIB application, Plaintiff alleges disability due to glaucoma, “legal blindness,” and headaches. (Id. at 61, 74, 205, 663-64.) The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially and upon reconsideration, and on November 19, 2020, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Id. at 13.) On August 11, 2021, Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert (“VE”) testified at a telephonic hearing before an ALJ. (Id. at 13, 29-58, 823-52.) On September 22, 2021, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application. (Id. at 13-23.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on August 10, 2022, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Id. at 1-6.) Plaintiff then sought judicial review of that decision. On March 14, 2024, a judge from this district issued an Opinion and Order reversing the Commissioner’s decision and remanding Plaintiff’s case for further proceedings. (Id. at 710-23.) The district court entered judgment that same day and the Appeals Council’s remand order followed on June 27, 2024. (Id. at 724-29.) Later that year, on December 10, 2024, Plaintiff, a VE, and an impartial medical expert, W. Benton Boone, M.D. (“Dr. Boone”), testified at a second hearing before a new ALJ. (Id. at 643-72.) The new ALJ issued a decision on April 14, 2025, denying Plaintiff’s DIB application. (Id. at 619-33.) Plaintiff requested and received an extension of time in which to appeal and then filed the present action in federal court. (Id. at 614- 15.) /// II. THE SEQUENTIAL PROCESS A claimant is considered disabled if he or she is unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than [twelve] months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). “Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for determining whether an applicant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Those five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant can return to any past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. at 724-25. To establish a “prima facie case of a disability,” a claimant must demonstrate “at steps one through four of the sequential evaluation process that she suffers from a severe impairment that prevents her from doing any work she has done in the past, or that she has a severe impairment and has no relevant past work[.]” White v. Kijakazi, 44 F.4th 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999)). If the claimant does so, “[t]he burden then shifts to the Commissioner at step five to establish that the claimant can perform a ‘significant number[]’ of jobs in the national economy given the claimant’s physical and mental limitations, age, education, and work experience.” Id. (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); and then citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002)). “If the Commissioner meets [his] burden, the claimant has failed to establish disability.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 955 (simplified). ///

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