A county commissioner's public records lawsuit claim was dismissed under Oregon's anti-SLAPP law.

Record source: CourtListener

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION DAVID LOVEALL, a Lane County Case No. 6:26-cv-00534-MC Commissioner, OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff, v. LANE COUNTY, a local government entity; STEVE MOKROHISKY, in his personal and official capacity as Lane County Administrator; HEATHER BUCH, in her personal and official capacity as a Lane County Commissioner; LAURIE TRIEGER, in her personal and official capacity as a Lane County Commissioner; and PAT FARR, in his personal and official capacity as a Lane County Commissioner, Defendants. MCSHANE, Judge: Plaintiff David Loveall, a Lane County Commissioner, alleges that Defendants—Lane County and certain members of its Board of Commissioners—violated his constitutional rights and Oregon Public Meetings Law because they disagreed with Plaintiff’s publicly expressed views. Compl. ¶¶ 1–4, ECF No. 1. Commissioner Defendants1 now move to strike Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Relief pursuant 1 Plaintiff brought this action against Lane County, Steve Mokrohisky (in his personal and official capacity as Lane County Administrator), and three “Commissioner Defendants”: Heather Buch, Laurie Trieger, and Pat Farr, all in their personal and official capacities as Lane County Commissioners. It is the Commissioner Defendants who make this Special Motion to Strike. to Oregon’s anti-SLAPP2 statute. Comm’r Defs.’ Special Mot. to Strike (“Defs.’ Mot.”), at 1–2, ECF No. 10; Compl. ¶¶ 135–48. Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim is subject to Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute. And because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead his Fifth Claim for Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Commissioner Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim for Relief is accordingly DISMISSED without prejudice. BACKGROUND At the time he filed this action, Plaintiff David Loveall was a Lane County Commissioner, elected in 2022 and campaigning for reelection in the May 19, 2026, election. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5. Plaintiff is a Christian whose “political and personal views ‘triggered’ certain county employees.” Id. ¶ 1. In 2025, County administration opened an investigation into complaints made against Plaintiff by county employees. This investigation resulted in a “safety plan” that prohibited Plaintiff from accessing his county office two days per week. Id. ¶¶ 1, 30. While Plaintiff would characterize the investigation as retaliation for the constitutionally protected expression of his religious views, the complaints against him could reasonably be characterized as something else. For example: • “Tell the employees to fuck off, commissioners can do what they want and there’s nothing anyone can do about it.” • “This is your [Mokrohisky’s] responsibility. You’re allowing these people to make these complaints, so you need to stop them from making these complaints or I’m going to deal with it.” • “Tell employees to stop it. There’s nothing they can do to stop commissioners from saying and doing whatever they want. You are not doing your job . . . I’m really upset. And if you don’t fix this, then you and I have a problem and I am going to do everything I can to get rid of these 2 “Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation.” E.g., Craft Renovations Inc. v. Harris, 570 P.3d 629, 632 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Neumann v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1127 (Or. 2016)). people.” • “Can someone give me a list of bad words that I can’t say? We need a culture change. This DEI thing is over the top. Words like blessings and spinster are triggers?” See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1, at 4, ECF No. 9-1.3 The investigation found that, by expressing his views, “Plaintiff retaliated against employees in violation of a county personnel rule.” Compl. ¶ 3. “The Board of Commissioners voted to censure Plaintiff at a meeting without prior notice to the public” as required by Oregon Public Meetings Law. Id. Plaintiff submits that Defendants denied him both “a name clearing hearing” and “his statutory right to have an open meeting to consider the allegations, investigation, and evidence against him.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants violated his First Amendment rights of free speech and free exercise of his “Christian beliefs.” Id. ¶¶ 90–118. Plaintiff also claims that Defendants retaliated against him for engaging in protected activities and denied him procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 119–134. Finally, Plaintiff alleges four violations of Oregon Public Records Law by the County and Commissioner Defendants—his Fifth Claim for Relief. Id. ¶¶ 135–48. When Defendants filed this Motion, they also moved to dismiss his Fourth and Fifth Claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, at 1–2, ECF No. 9; see 3 When Defendants moved to strike Plaintiff’s Fifth Claim, they also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 9. While the scope of review on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally limited to the complaint, a court may consider other evidence if: “(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006)). Here, Plaintiff references the County’s investigation and its investigative report, both central to the dispute. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 1– 3, 63–71. And Plaintiff does not question the authenticity of the copy of the investigative report Defendants submitted with their Motion to Dismiss. See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1. also Aug. 19, 2026, Op. & Order (dismissing without prejudice Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Claims). LEGAL STANDARD Oregon’s anti-SLAPP statute “creates an expedited procedure for dismissal of certain nonmeritorious civil cases without prejudice at the pleading stage.” Neumann v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1127 (Or. 2016); Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Verizon Del., Inc. v. Covad Co

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