A county official's due process and injunction claims were thrown out by a federal judge.

Record source: CourtListener

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION DAVID LOVEALL, a Lane County Case No. 6:26-cv-00534-MC Commissioner, OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff, v. LANE COUNTY, a local government entity; STEVE MOKROHISKY, in his personal and official capacity as Lane County Administrator; HEATHER BUCH, in her personal and official capacity as a Lane County Commissioner; LAURIE TRIEGER, in her personal and official capacity as a Lane County Commissioner; and PAT FARR, in his personal and official capacity as a Lane County Commissioner, Defendants. MCSHANE, Judge: Plaintiff David Loveall seeks declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Defendants,1 for allegedly violating his constitutional rights and Oregon Public Meetings Law. Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1. Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See generally Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No. 9. 1 Defendants are Lane County (“the County”), Steve Mokrohisky, in his personal and official capacity as Lane County Administrator, and three Lane County Commissioners: Heather Buch, Laurie Trieger, and Pat Farr (“Commissioner Defendants”), all in their personal and official capacities as County Commissioners. Because Plaintiff has not identified a property or liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, his Fourth Claim for Relief is dismissed. And because Plaintiff has not identified a cognizable injury allowing for injunctive relief, his Fifth Claim for Relief is dismissed. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 9, is GRANTED. BACKGROUND At the time he filed this action, Plaintiff David Loveall was a Lane County Commissioner, elected to the Board of Commissioners (“the Board”) in 2022 and campaigning for reelection in the May 19, 2026, election. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 5. In 2025, County administration began investigating Plaintiff because his political and personal views “triggered” certain other employees. Id. ¶ 1. When Plaintiff expressed “blessings” in a birthday card to a co-worker, for example, the coworker “reportedly did not feel safe around Plaintiff.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that he was “falsely accused of describing a woman as ‘looking like a stripper.’” Id. The investigation resulted in a “safety plan” that prohibited Plaintiff from accessing his office two days per week. Id. While Plaintiff would characterize the investigation as retaliation for the constitutionally protected expression of his religious views, the complaints against him could reasonably be characterized as something else. For example, Plaintiff allegedly said: • “Tell the employees to fuck off, commissioners can do what they want and there’s nothing anyone can do about it.” • “This is your [Mokrohisky’s] responsibility. You’re allowing these people to make these complaints, so you need to stop them from making these complaints or I’m going to deal with it.” • “Tell employees to stop it. There’s nothing they can do to stop commissioners from saying and doing whatever they want. You are not doing your job . . . I’m really upset. And if you don’t fix this, then you and I have a problem and I am going to do everything I can to get rid of these people.” • “Can someone give me a list of bad words that I can’t say? We need a culture change. This DEI thing is over the top. Words like blessings and spinster are triggers?” Defs.’ Mot. Ex. 1, at 4, ECF No. 9-1.2 Throughout the investigation, Plaintiff believed he was “accused of retaliation” when he attempted to publicly defend himself. Compl. ¶ 2. The Board instructed Plaintiff to stop defending himself. Id. The County also publicly released the allegations against Plaintiff. Id. The investigation found that, by expressing his views, “Plaintiff retaliated against employees in violation of a county personnel rule.” Id. ¶ 3. After County released the investigative report, Plaintiff requested a copy and asked for the “evidence relied on by the investigator in making his findings.” Id. The Board denied his request. Id. Plaintiff also requested a name clearing hearing and an open meeting to discuss the allegations, investigation, and evidence against him. Id. The Board denied these requests, too. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the Board unlawfully “voted to censure Plaintiff at a meeting without prior notice to the public that censure would be considered.” Id. On March 19, 2026, Plaintiff filed this action seeking declaratory judgment that the County and the Board violated (1) his constitutional rights to free speech and free exercise of religion; (2) his right to due process; and (3) his right to be free from retaliation. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff also asks the Court to enforce Oregon Public Meetings Law. Id. Finally, Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction “of the County’s continued violation of his rights.” Id. 2 While the scope of review on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally limited to the complaint, a court may consider other evidence if: “(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the plaintiff’s claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006)). Here, Plaintiff references the County’s investigation and its investigative report, both central to the dispute. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 1–3, 63–71. And Plaintiff does not question the authenticity of the copy of the investigative report that Defendants submitted with their Motion to Dismiss. See Mot. to Dismiss Ex. 1. LEGAL STANDARD To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face when the “factual content” allows the court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The well-pleaded facts must present more than “the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679. When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept all allegations of material fact as true and construe them

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