Workers who sign employer arbitration agreements may lose their right to sue in court.
Aetaekayakalua Shimoyama Riley v. Samsung Electronics Home Appliances
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Workers who sign employer arbitration agreements may lose their right to sue in court.
Why it matters
In Riley v. Samsung Electronics Home Appliances America, LLC, a federal district court in South Carolina is considering whether to dismiss an employment discrimination lawsuit and send it to arbitration instead. The plaintiff, a former Samsung employee, filed claims under the ADA, FMLA, Title VII, the Rehabilitation Act, and South Carolina law after his termination for attendance violations. Samsung moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement the plaintiff signed on his first day of employment, and the court is reviewing motions to dismiss, for summary judgment on contract formation, and a discovery motion from the plaintiff.
Who it affects
This ruling primarily affects employees who sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment and later wish to bring workplace discrimination or retaliation claims in court. It also affects employers who use mandatory arbitration programs to manage employment disputes.
What happens next
Current
Decision issued Jul 29, 2026
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Parties can ask the same court to reconsider. Then: possible appeal to the circuit court.
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- Decision issued Jul 29, 2026
- Possible rehearingParties can ask the same court to reconsider.
- Possible appeal to the circuit court
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Jul 29, 2026
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DEEPER READ
The core question in this case is whether the plaintiff must resolve his employment discrimination claims through private arbitration rather than in federal court. Samsung hired the plaintiff in December 2024 as a Process Innovation Technician at its Newberry County, South Carolina facility, and terminated him in March 2025 for attendance violations. On his first day of work, the plaintiff signed an Alternative Dispute Resolution agreement that required all covered employment disputes to go to binding arbitration and explicitly waived the right to a jury trial. The arbitration agreement was broad in scope. It covered claims under Title VII, the ADA, the FMLA, the Rehabilitation Act, and any other federal or state employment laws, as well as claims for wrongful termination, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The agreement stated that arbitration was a condition of employment and that no covered claim could be brought in court or any other forum. Samsung filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. A prior magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation suggesting the motion to compel arbitration should be granted, though that ruling was only partial. Samsung also filed a motion for summary judgment limited to the question of whether a valid contract was actually formed, meaning whether the agreement the plaintiff signed is legally enforceable. The plaintiff filed his own motion seeking production of complete onboarding documents, likely relevant to the contract formation question. The opinion excerpt does not yet reveal the final ruling on these motions. What is clear is that the dispute centers on whether the arbitration agreement is valid and whether it covers the plaintiff's specific claims. The outcome will determine whether the plaintiff can pursue his case in federal court or must instead go through a private arbitration process.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA Aetaekayakalua Shimoyama Riley, ) C/A No.: 8:25-8398-TMC-TER ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ORDER AND ) REPORT AND Samsung Electronics Home ) RECOMMENDATION Appliances America, LLC, ) ) Defendant. ) ) In this employment discrimination case, Aetaekayakalua Shimoyama Riley (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, sues Samsung Electronics Home Appliances America, LLC (“Defendant” or “SEHA”), and asserts claims, including for discrimination and retaliation, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 , the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 , Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e ., and Sections 503 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and under South Carolina law for constructive discharge and for violations of South Carolina Human Affairs Law (“SCHAL”) S.C. Code Ann. § 1-13-10 [ ECF No. 9 at 5 (“This action arises from wrongful termination, disability discrimination, retaliation, and violations of federal and South Carolina law.”)]. This matter comes before the court on the following motions: Defendant’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. [ECF No. 28];1 Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the limited issue of contract formation [ECF No. 55]; and Plaintiff’s motion to compel production of complete onboarding documents [ECF No. 61]. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(g) (D.S.C.). I. Factual and Procedural Background A. Relevant Facts In 2018, Defendant began commercial production at its first U.S.-based home appliance manufacturing facility in Newberry County, South Carolina. [ECF No. 28-1 ¶ 3]. Defendant manufactures washing machines, producing the products’ washer cabinets, inner tubs, and bases from blank steel. The plant has two assembly lines that combine made-in-house components with supplied modules. Those products are then packed for shipment to consumers nationwide. On or around December 23, 2024, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work as a Process Innovation Technician. ¶ 5. Plaintiff continued to work until his 1 This motion has partially been ruled on as discussed further in the recitation of the procedural history. 2 employment was terminated for attendance violations. Plaintiff’s termination was effective on or around March 5, 2025. As a condition of his employment with Defendant, on December 23, 2024, Plaintiff signed Defendant’s Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, which included a mutual Mediation and Arbitration Agreement. [ECF No. 28-2 (“Arbitration Agreement”)]. The Arbitration Agreement includes the following provisions: Agreement to Submit to Arbitration. In consideration for and as a material condition of employment with SEHA, final and binding arbitration is the exclusive means for Employees to resolve covered claims. SEHA likewise agrees to submit covered claims to arbitration. Employee and SEHA are each waiving their rights to trial by jury in exchange for arbitration. No other action may be brought in court or in any other forum. This Agreement is a waiver of all rights to a civil court action for a covered claim. Only the Arbitrator, not a judge or jury, will decide the claim . . . . Covered Claims. Claims covered by this Agreement include claims against SEHA, its partners, parent company, directors, officers, managers, supervisors, Employees and agents and any of their assignees or successors, and include, but are not limited to, the following claims: (a) alleged violations of federal, state and/or local constitutions, statutes, regulations or ordinances, including, but not limited to, laws dealing with unlawful discrimination and harassment (but not sexual harassment); (b) claims based on any purported breach of contractual obligation, including but not limited to breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, wrongful termination, retaliation, or constructive discharge; (c) alleged violations of public policy; (d) claims based in contract or tort (but not sexual assault) ; (e) claims for wages or other compensation due; and (f) any and all other legal claims arising out of Employee’s employment with or termination by SEHA. 3 THIS INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991, THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITY ACT, THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974; AND ANY OTHER FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL EMPLOYMENT OR LABOR LAWS, INCLUDING THOSE LAWS RELATING Tb DISCRIMINATION BASED ON THE FOLLOWING PROTECTED CATEGORIES AMONG ANY OTHERS: SEX AND GENDER; RACE; RELIGION; NATIONAL ORIGIN; MENTAL OR PHYSICAL DISABILITY; VETERAN OR MILITARY STATUS; FAMILIAL STATUS; MARITAL STATUS; SEXUAL ORIENTATION; AGE; PREGNANCY; AND RETALIATION OR WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY FOR ALLEGING OR FILING OR PARTICIPATING IN ANY INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL PROCEEDING OR OTHERWISE COMPLAINING OF ANY WRONG RELATING TO THE AFOREMENTIONED CATEGORIES OR ANY PUBLIC POLICY . . . . (emphasis in original). B. Procedural History SEHA filed its motion to dismiss and compel arbitration on October 8, 2025, and Plaintiff filed his response on November 6, 2026. [ECF Nos. 28, 32]. On November 20, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges2 issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending SEHA’s motion to compel arbitra
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