A prisoner's lawsuit over withheld personal property faces dismissal by a federal court.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION Lewis Anthony Ingram, ) C/A No. 8:26-cv-2584-MGL-WSB ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ) York County Detention Center, Sgt. Jenks, ) Sgt. Thompson, Captain Steven Kitchen, ) ) Defendants. ) ) Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights against the above-named Defendants. Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is presently incarcerated at the Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”). The events giving rise to the claims, however, occurred at the York County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court. For the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal. BACKGROUND Factual Allegations Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard form seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff contends his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because he was deprived of his personal property, including a gold bracelet, two gold necklaces, a gold watch, and shoes. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges Defendants have failed to release the personal property to his brother, Fred Ingram, despite Plaintiff signing a release of property form on May 12, 2026. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was arrested in Rock Hill on January 30, 2026, and booked into the York County Detention Center. Id. at 6. Plaintiff contends that his “brother was deprived my personal property.” Id. For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he suffered from PTSD, mental anguish, pain and physical stress, and mental embarrassment. Id. at 8. For relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount of $50,000. Id. STANDARD OF REVIEW Screening and Liberal Construction of Pro se Pleadings Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and he “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). This statute charges the Court with screening Plaintiff’s lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff has also requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which authorizes this Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, the pro se pleading remains subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff’s legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417–18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The Court’s duty to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s complaint does not require the Court “to remove [it’s] heavy robe . . . and take on the role of the litigant’s attorney.” Jackson v. Dameron, 171 F. 4th 641, 652 (4th Cir. 2026). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in his pleadings, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact); cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (holding that plaintiff need not pin his claim for relief to precise legal theory). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Owens v. Baltimore City State’s Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 The Complaint is filed pursuant to § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, as follows: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .

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