A man's application for federal disability benefits was denied and that denial was upheld.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA GREENVILLE DIVISION TRAVIS P., § Plaintiff, § § § vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:25-7375-MGL § COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, § Defendant. § ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO THE EXTENT PROVIDED HEREIN AND AFFIRMING DEFENDANT’S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS 1. INTRODUCTION This is a Social Security appeal in which Plaintiff Travis P. seeks to obtain judicial review of the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security denying his claims for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income benefits (SSI) under Titles I and XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (Report) of the United States Magistrate Judge suggesting to the Court the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. The Magistrate Judge filed the Report in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Travis P. filed applications for DIB and SSI on December 28, 2022, alleging he became unable to work on October 21, 2015. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied the applications initially and upon reconsideration. On August 30, 2024, Travis P. requested a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which was held on March 27, 2025, via telephone from Greenville, South Carolina. Travis P. was represented by counsel, and David Vandergoot, an impartial vocational expert (VE), appeared and offered testimony. On April 14, 2025, the ALJ issued a decision concluding Travis P. had failed to establish he was under a disability as defined in the Social Security Act, as amended. The ALJ’s finding became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when, on June 23, 2025, the Appeals Council denied Travis P.’s request for review. Travis P. then filed this action for judicial review. The Magistrate Judge filed the Report on July 1, 2026, and Travis P. filed his objections to the Report on July 14, 2026. The Court has carefully reviewed the objections, but holds them to be without merit. It will therefore enter judgment accordingly. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. For reviewing the Report The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is made, and the Court may 2 accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). B. For reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). The five steps are: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a medically determinable severe impairment(s); (3) whether such impairment(s) meets or equals an impairment set forth in Appendix I of 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P; (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the requirements of his past relevant work; and, if so, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform any other work considering his RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v). It is the plaintiff’s duty both to produce evidence and to prove he is disabled under the Social Security Act. See Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, the ALJ is to develop the record, and when he “fails in his duty to fully inquire into the issues necessary for adequate development of the record, and such failure is prejudicial to the claimant, the case should be remanded.” Marsh v. Harris, 632 F.2d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 1980). It is also the task of the ALJ, as opposed to this Court, to make findings of fact and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). “It is not within the province of this [C]ourt to determine the weight of the evidence; nor is it [the Court’s] function to substitute [its] judgment for that of [the defendant] if [the] decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966), (overruled by implication on 3 other grounds by Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822 (2003). In other words, the Court “must sustain the ALJ’s decision, even if [the Court] disagree[s] with it, provided the determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996). Under the substantial evidence standard, the Court reviews the entire record as a whole. Hanes v. Celebrezze, 337 F.2d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1964). Although the ALJ must sufficiently explain the reasons for his ruling to allow this Court to provide meaningful review, Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2013), “the ALJ is not required to address every piece of evidence. . . . [Instead,] [s/he] must build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to [her/his] conclusion.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000) (first citing Green v. Apfel, 207 F.3d 780, 780 (7th Cir. 2000); and then citing Groves v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1998)). The Court’s “general practice, which [it] see[s] no reason to depart from here, is to take a lower tribunal at its word when it declares . . . it has considered a matter.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005). “[T]he substantial evidence standard ‘presupposes . . . a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts. An administrative decision is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.’” Clarke v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 271, 272–73 (8th Cir. 1988) (quoting Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)). Put differently, if the ALJ’s “dispositive factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, they must be affirmed, even in cases where contrary findings of an ALJ might also be so supported.” Kellough v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1147, 1149 (4th Cir. 1986). 4 IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS A. Whether the Court should overrule or sustain Travis P.’s Objections As the Magistrate Judge stated in the Report, [Travis P.] submitted new evidence subsequent to the issuance of the ALJ’s decision that was exhibit

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