Homeowner loses insurance lawsuit filed too late under policy's one-year deadline.

Record source: CourtListener

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY NORTHERN DIVISION AT ASHLAND CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-50-DLB-EBA MAURICE OAKLEY PLAINTIFF v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY and STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY DEFENDANTS * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * This matter is before the Court upon Defendants State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company’s (“State Farm”) Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 16). Plaintiff Maurice Oakley has responded to the motion (Docket No. 21) and State Farm has filed a reply (Docket No. 23). In addition, Plaintiff has filed a motion to Modify the Scheduling Order and File an Amended Complaint (Docket No. 20) to which State Farm has responded (Docket No. 24). For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion and grant Defendants’ motion. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case arises from Plaintiff’s claim for coverage pursuant to a policy of homeowners insurance purchased from State Farm, Policy No. 17-BD-E138-7 for property damage sustained on December 10, 2023, as a result of a windstorm. State Farm issued a payment under the policy on March 7, 2024, in the amount of $63,547.26. Plaintiff initiated this civil action on March 12, 2025, in Greenup Circuit Court, alleging breach of contract, bad faith and unfair claims settlement practices. (Complaint, Docket No. 1-1). He asserts extensive damage to his home caused by a December 10, 2023 “covered event.” Id. at ¶ 5. On April 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in Greenup Circuit Court, adding that State Farm breached its contract by “refusing to repair and/or replace” the home and including a claim under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act. (Amended Complaint, Docket 1-1, ¶¶ 16,17 and 20). On May 2, 2025, State Farm filed a timely Notice of Removal matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 and 1446 based upon diversity of citizenship as set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Docket No. 1). On October 14, 2025, Plaintiff sought, again, to amend his complaint. (Docket No. 9). However, on November 14, 2025, that motion was withdrawn. (Docket No. 11). The same day, another motion to amend was filed. (Docket No. 12). In that proposed amended complaint, Plaintiff maintained that his home was damaged on December 10, 2023, but that the chimney fell on January 24, 2024, causing additional damage. Id. He further proposed to allege that “the extent of the damage was hidden and unknown to the Plaintiff until it became apparent later in 2025 at later dates.” Id. Magistrate Judge Edward B. Atkins denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding the proposed amendments to be futile because they were plainly time-barred. (Docket No. 15). Magistrate Judge Atkins specifically found that the policy at issue required any civil action to be brought within one year after the date of loss or damage, which would have been prior to January 24, 2025, two months prior to the filing of the lawsuit in Greenup County. Id. at pg. 2. As such, any proposed additional claim was time-barred. With regard to Plaintiff’s attempt to find recourse in the “discovery rule,” he found it was not applicable, stating that “Kentucky courts have routinely declined to extend the “discovery rule— a rule first applied in the medical malpractice context—to contracts limitations clauses in insurance contract disputes.” Id. at pg. 3 (internal citations omitted). Magistrate Judge Atkins concluded that, “even taking everything Oakley alleges in his complaint as true, he fails to state a recoverable breach of contract claim. Consequently, because his amended complaint is futile, the Court declines to grant him leave to amend it.” Id. at pg. 4. State Farm seeks dismissal of all claims alleged against it. (Docket No. 16). Plaintiff, again, seeks to amend his complaint, more than four months after the deadline to join parties or amend pleadings. (Docket No. 20). As a result, Plaintiff also seeks a modification of the Court’s previously entered scheduling order. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “When there are pending before the court both a dispositive motion and a motion to amend the complaint, the court must first address the motion to amend the complaint.” Gallaher & Assocs. Inc., v. Emerald TC, LLC, No. 3:08-cv-459, 2010 WL 670078, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010) (citing Ellison v. Ford Motor Co., 847 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 1988)). “If the court grants a motion to amend, ‘the original pleading no longer performs any function in the case.’” McIlwain v. Jefferson Cnty., No. 3:25-cv-40-RGJ, 2026 WL 711552, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 13, 2026) (citing Clark v. Johnston, 413 F. App’x 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, “when the court grants leave to amend the complaint, a motion to dismiss the original complaint will be denied as moot if the amended complaint adequately addresses the grounds for dismissal.” Stepp v. Alibaba.com, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-00389-CRS, 2016 WL 5844097, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 4, 2016). Amendments to pleadings are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Under Rule 15, a plaintiff can amend his complaint one time within twenty-one days of serving the original complaint or at any point before the defendant answers the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Rule 15 further provides that even if the party does not seek the amendment within those twenty-one days, the court may give leave to permit such an amendment and should “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “[A] court need not grant a motion to amend when the reason for the amendment is improper, ‘such as . . . futility of amendment[.]’” Skatemore, Inc. v. Whitmer, 40 F.4th 727, 737 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir. 2018)) (emphasis in original). “An amendment is futile when, after including the proposed changes, the complaint still ‘could not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’” Id. (quoting Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of OH, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010)). With regard to dismissal, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether the plaintiff has “‘state[d] a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A complaint does not have to show that liability is probable, but the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). If a reasonable court “can draw the necessary inference from the factual material stated in the complaint, the plausibility standard has been satisfied.” Keys v. Humana, Inc. 684 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). In adjudicating a motion to dismiss, a court should accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and then determine whether the plaintiff

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