A detainee released from immigration custody loses his right to keep fighting in court.

Record source: CourtListener

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY NORTHERN DIVISION at Covington SHAMSIDDIN ASLAMOV, ) ) Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 2:25-cv-00218-SCM ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ) ORDER JAMES A. DALEY, et al., ) ) Respondents. ) ) *** *** *** *** The Petitioner, Shamsiddin Aslamov, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus contending that he was being illegally detained by the Department of Homeland Security. [Dkt. 1]. After the Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition, [Dkt. 4], and his Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, [Dkt. 5], the Federal Respondents filed a Response, [Dkt. 8]. The Court then directed the Respondents to respond to the First Amended Petition. [Dkt. 9]. The Federal Respondents filed an updated Response to the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on March 26, 2026, requesting dismissal of this matter as moot because the Petitioner was “released from ICE custody on or about February 25, 2026, on an ‘Order of Release on Recognizance.’” [Dkt. 10 at 2]. The updated Response included the Order of Release on Recognizance as an exhibit, which in turn indicated that there are no additional conditions placed on the Petitioner’s release. [Dkt. 10-1]. In response to this development, the Court directed the Petitioner to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed as moot. [Dkt. 11]. The Petitioner filed a timely response to the show-cause order arguing that his release from custody did not render this matter moot because he requested declaratory relief, an injunction against re-detaining him, and asked this Court to set aside the Respondents’ conduct as unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act. [Dkt. 12 at 1–2]. He also argued that this matter is not moot because he may be detained again arbitrarily. [Id. at 2]. The Court then held this matter in abeyance pending issuance of the mandate in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026), and denied all pending motions without prejudice. [Dkt. 14]. That mandate has since issued. Upon fresh consideration of the First Amended Petition, the Respondents’ filings, and the Petitioner’s response thereto, the Court concludes that this matter should be dismissed as moot. “Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Brock v. United States Dep’t of Just., 256 F. App’x 748, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). The “‘case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings,’ . . . . [I]t is not enough that a dispute was alive when [the petitioner’s] habeas corpus petition was filed in the district court. [The petitioner] must continue to have an actual injury that is capable of being redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477). “Mootness results when events occur during the pendency of the litigation which render the court unable to grant the requested relief.” Id. at 750 (citing Berger v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 983 F.2d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 1993)). “As relates to habeas, a district court lacks jurisdiction over the petition if the petitioner is not in government custody; therefore, the individual’s release from custody generally moots a habeas petition.” Khan v. Att’y Gen. of the United States, No. 1:15 CV 2014, 2016 WL 4004616, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 17, 2016) (citing Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 633 (1982)); report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:15 CV 2014, 2016 WL 4009885 (N.D. Ohio July 25, 2016); see also Enazeh v. Davis, 107 F. App’x 489, 491 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding deportation rendered moot the portion of a habeas petition seeking release); Frimpong v. Sessions, No. 4:18-CV-0125, 2018 WL 2422038, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2018) (same), report and recommendation adopted, No. 4:18CV0125, 2018 WL 2417841 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 2018). Because the Petitioner was released from custody with no additional conditions, his Petition is now moot. See Khan, 2016 WL 4004616, at *2 (“As Petitioner has received his requested relief by being released from custody on an order of supervision, there is no longer an active case or controversy.”). Moreover, because there are no additional conditions placed on the Petitioner’s release from custody, his fear that he will be re-detained arbitrarily without a lawful basis is speculative—especially in the wake of the Sixth Circuit’s intervening opinion in Lopez-Campos. The Petitioner does not establish that his detention is “capable of repetition, yet evading review” such that this Court retains jurisdiction over his Petition.1 Lane, 455 U.S. at 633–34. The Petitioner points to Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 395–96 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), for the proposition that a grant of release on parole does not moot his Petition. [Dkt. 12 at 2–3]. In that case, the Sixth Circuit determined that the “restrictive conditions” placed on the habeas petitioner’s “release[] from INS detention” meant that he was still “‘in custody’ for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” Rosales-Garcia, 322 F.3d at 394–95. The Sixth Circuit has more recently reaffirmed that an individual is deemed detained or “in custody” for habeas purposes when the 1 The “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness has two elements: “(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). “The second prong of the ‘capable of repetition’ exception requires a ‘reasonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability’ that ‘the same controversy will recur involving the same complaining party.’” Id. at 463 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482 (1982) (per curiam)). A controversy is “sufficiently likely to recur when a party has a reasonable expectation that it ‘will again be subjected to the alleged illegality.’” Id. (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that this exception to mootness “applies only in exceptional situations.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 109. Here, the exception’s second element is not met. The Petitioner has not demonstrated anything other than a speculative, general fear that he could be re-detained by the Respondents at some indeterminate point in the future. [See Dkt. 12 at 3 (“Respondents have not pledged that they will never re-detain Mr. Aslamov under the circumstances under which they previous[ly] detained him or otherwise violate his Constitutional rights.”)]. Given

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