Companies must give detailed discovery answers, not vague promises to respond later.

Record source: CourtListener

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA APOLLO HOLDING COMPANY, CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-2773 LLC ET AL. SECTION “N”(3) VERSUS CLIFF ROE ET AL. ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is Defendant Bohr Energy LLC’s (“Bohr”) Motion to Compel Plaintiff Apollo Holding Company, LLC (“Apollo” or “Plaintiff”), to Provide Complete Responses to Defendant Bohr’s First Set of Interrogatories (R. Doc. 100), Apollo’s opposition (R. Doc. 105), and Bohr’s reply (R. Doc. 106). Oral argument took place on September 29, 2026. For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED. I. Background Apollo, through its predecessor-in-interest, and Defendant Cliff Roe (“Roe”) jointly executed an Employment Agreement on January 29, 2016, through which Roe agreed to convey equipment and intellectual property to Apollo. This included: all of Employee’s equipment, demo units, devices, applications, intellectual property, patents pending and other property whether related to the Advanced Separation Gas Infusion System, which Employee developed, or otherwise. This conveyance specially includes all of Employee’s property and systems currently in development and developed in the future, whether the Gas Infusion System or any other related or unrelated technology. This conveyance also includes any use currently known or unknown for intellectual property conveyed.1 1 R. Doc. 87 at ¶ 9. The intellectual property relates to remediation treatment solutions for Hydrogen Sulfide (“H2S”). H2S—the highly flammable and toxic gas known for its rotten egg smell—is naturally present within oil and gas wells and is also a by-product of the petroleum refinery process. Apollo and plaintiff GAPS Technology, LLC2 (“GAPS”, collectively with Apollo “Plaintiffs”), in part through Roe’s efforts, successfully developed novel technologies for use in H2S remediation.3 Roe resigned from Apollo on June 21, 2023, with his last date of employment set for July 6, 2023.4 Apollo alleges Roe represented that his failing health prompted his retirement. On March 29, 2024, Roe, Apollo, and GAPS executed a Voluntary Separation Agreement, which “acknowledged Mr. Roe had conveyed intellectual property in which Apollo and. . . GAPS have exclusive ownership interests.”5 The agreement was amended on September 5, 2024, to provide Roe with ongoing payments as a 3% distribution interest holder of Apollo.6 Apollo alleges it agreed to this distribution interest so that Roe, believed to be in poor health, “would enjoy the benefits of a large amount of money before he passed away.”7 Rather than retiring, Roe and defendant Kevin Pavlov (“Pavlov”) formed Bohr Energy, LLC (“Bohr”), which also operates in the H2S remediation industry. Apollo 2 Apollo assigned, transferred, and conveyed all rights, titles, and interests acquired under the Employment Agreement to GAPS through a corporate restructuring. Id. ¶ 11. 3 Id. ¶ 13. 4 Id. ¶ 18. 5 Id. ¶ 25. 6 Id. ¶ 29. 7 Id. alleges Roe: (1) provided materially misleading representations regarding his health and intent to retire from the industry; (2) breached his employment agreement by utilizing intellectual property he had conveyed to Apollos; and (3) is engaged in unfair trade practices by misappropriating the intellectual and proprietary property of Apollos in business endeavors with Pavlov and Bohr. Apollo also alleges that Pavlov’s actions breached a non-disclosure agreement with Apollo (which Pavlov had entered into in connection with an Apollo site visit) and violated the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices Act. Bohr is subject to similar allegations. Bohr served Interrogatories on Apollo, seeking to clarify the factual basis for Apollo’s claims. Bohr has categorized the interrogatories as follows: • Identification of Alleged Promises by Roe and Pavlov; • Identification of Intellectual Property; • Identification of Alleged Competition; and • Identification of Damages.8 Apollo objects to many of the requests, arguing that many of these contention interrogatories are premature or the information sought is within Bohr’s possession, custody, or control, and that it will supplement these responses in accordance with the discovery schedule and its continued discovery obligations.9 8 R. Doc. 100-1 at 3. 9 R. Doc. 105 at 4, 11. II. Legal Standard Unless otherwise limited by court order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) defines the scope of discovery: “Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” A court assesses the proportionality by considering (1) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the parties’ resources; (4) the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues; and (5) whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Id. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable. Id. “The moving party bears the burden to establish that the materials requested are within the scope of permissible discovery, after which the burden shifts to the party resisting discovery to show why the discovery is irrelevant or otherwise should not be permitted.” Cannon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2021 WL 5358758, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2021) (citations omitted). Objections to a discovery request must be stated with specificity and identify whether any materials are being withheld based on that objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(4); Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(C); Rodriguez-Meza v. Venegas, 2020 WL 14100945, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2020). General boilerplate discovery objections are insufficient. McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485- 86 (5th Cir. 1990). Under Rule 26(c)(1), courts may restrict discovery “for good cause ... to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” The burden rests on the party objecting to the discovery request to demonstrate good cause exists to restrict discovery. See Cazorla v. Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 838 F.3d 540, 549 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing cases). “Discovery rules are accorded broad and liberal treatment to effect their purpose of adequately informing litigants in civil trials.” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979). Discovery rules, though, are subject to the “injun

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