A court converts a pleadings motion to summary judgment to examine key employment contracts.
Scott Dillon v. The Dow Chemical Company, et al.
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A court converts a pleadings motion to summary judgment to examine key employment contracts.
Why it matters
In Scott Dillon v. The Dow Chemical Company, et al., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana considered motions for judgment on the pleadings filed by Dow Chemical and Union Carbide, who argued that the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act bars Dillon's tort claims because they are his statutory employers. The court declined to rule on those motions outright, and instead converted them to motions for summary judgment under Rule 56, because the defendants attached contracts to their motions that were not part of the original complaint but could be decisive to the statutory employer question. The court gave all parties the opportunity to submit additional materials before the court resolves the issue.
Who it affects
This ruling most directly affects Scott Dillon and his ability to pursue tort claims against Dow Chemical and Union Carbide, as well as workers at third-party contractor companies who are injured at industrial facilities and wish to sue the facility owner outside of workers' compensation. It also affects businesses that contract with staffing or service companies and may face questions about their status as statutory employers under Louisiana law.
What happens next
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Decision issued Oct 7, 2026
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- Decision issued Oct 7, 2026
- Possible rehearingParties can ask the same court to reconsider.
- Possible appeal to the circuit court
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DEEPER READ
Scott Dillon was injured on April 25, 2025, while working as a tank hauler for PSC Group at a facility in Hahnville, Louisiana. He alleges that a valve on a rail car exploded while he was unloading acrylic acid, causing the acid to contact his face and legs and resulting in significant injuries. He filed negligence claims against several defendants, including Dow Chemical and Union Carbide, whom he alleges owned or operated the chemical plant and unloading rack. Dillon acknowledged that he was working within the scope of his employment with PSC at the time of the incident and that claims against his direct employer fall under workers' compensation. He argued, however, that he has valid third-party tort claims against Dow and Union Carbide for negligently servicing, maintaining, inspecting, or operating the rail car and its components. Dow and Union Carbide moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that each qualifies as Dillon's statutory employer under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act. As statutory employers, they contended, they are shielded from tort liability except for intentional acts, and because Dillon alleged no intentional acts, workers' compensation would be his exclusive remedy. In support, they attached excerpts from a services agreement and a hold harmless agreement between PSC and Dow, both predating the incident. The court identified a procedural problem: those contracts were not referenced or incorporated in Dillon's complaint, so the court could not simply consider them under the normal Rule 12(c) pleadings standard. Because the documents could be decisive on the statutory employer question, the court exercised its authority under Rule 12(d) to convert the motions into motions for summary judgment under Rule 56. This conversion allows the court to consider materials outside the pleadings, but it also requires giving the parties a fair opportunity to present relevant evidence. The court therefore allowed Dillon, Dow, and Union Carbide to submit additional materials before a final ruling is made. No final ruling on the merits has been issued. The court's decision here is procedural, setting the stage for a more complete factual record before resolving whether Dillon's tort claims against Dow and Union Carbide are blocked by workers' compensation law.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA SCOTT DILLON CIVIL ACTION v. NO: 25-2136 THE DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY, SECTION: C (1) ET AL. ORDER AND REASONS Defendant Union Carbide Corporation’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (R. Doc. 30) and Defendant The Dow Chemical Company’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (R. Doc. 32), each filed on January 9, 2026, are before the court.1 I. BACKGROUND Dillon alleges he suffered severe and debilitating injuries from a rail car chemical leak on April 25, 2025. He claims the negligence of defendants caused his injuries.2 1 These motions are unopposed. Plaintiff requested extended time to respond to the motions, which the court denied. R. Doc. 44. This does not mean the court can simply grant the motion as unopposed. See, e.g., Servicios Azucareros de Venezuela, C.A. v. John Deere Thibodeaux, Inc., 702 F.3d 794, 806 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that district courts may not summarily grant motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 solely due to a lack of opposition); Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); John v. Louisiana (Bd. of Trustees), 757 F.2d 698, 709 (5th Cir. 1985). 2 Four of the five original defendants remain parties in this case. On May 7, 2026, plaintiff’s request to dismiss defendant, Marmon Railroad Services, LLC, was granted. R. Doc. 46. The remaining defendants are The Dow Chemical Company, Union Carbide Corporation, which move herein, Union Tank Car Company, and UTLX Manufacturing, L.L.C. Dillon worked as a tank hauler for PSC Group, L.L.C. at a facility in Hahnville, Louisiana.3 While attempting to unload acrylic acid from a rail car, a valve exploded releasing the acid, which contacted his face and legs.4 As a result of this contact, Dillon suffered significant injuries.5 Dillon argues either Union Carbide Corporation, The Dow Chemical Company, or both, owned and operated the chemical plant and unloading rack, and either UTLX Manufacturing, L.L.C., Union Tank Car Company, or both, owned the rail car.6 Dillon acknowledges he was in the course and scope of his employment with PSC when the incident occurred and that “[a]ny and all claims against his employer fall under the workers’ compensation regime.”7 He asserts, however, that he has viable third-party claims against Dow and Union Carbide, among others, who negligently serviced, maintained, inspected or operated the rail car and its relevant components.8 Dillon claims a non-exhaustive list of acts and omissions demonstrate defendants’ negligence leading to the April 25, 2025 events, and argues defendants are liable under respondent superior for the actions of their agents.9 3 R. Doc. 1 at 2. 4 Id. 5 Id. at 3. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Id. at 3–4. 9 Id. at 4–6. DOW and Union Carbide argue Dillon’s claims are barred by the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.10 They contend each is the statutory employer of Dillon, shielding both from tort liability except for intentional acts.11 Because Dillon does not allege an intentional act, the exclusive remedy of workers compensation applies.12 In support, DOW and Union Carbide cite attachments to their answer (R. Docs. 11-1, 11-2) as evidence of their status as statutory employer.13 II. ANALYSIS A. Rule 12(c) Review Standard “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) permits any party to move for a judgment on the pleadings, provided the motion is made early enough to avoid delaying trial.” NAZ, LLC v. Philips Healthcare, a Division of Philips Electronics North America Corp., No. CV 17-2882, 2018 WL 1202570, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 8, 2018) (citing Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., 313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002)). “A court may grant a Rule 12(c) motion only if the pleadings evince no disputes of genuine material fact and questions of law alone remain.” Id. (citing id.). “A motion brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings 10 The legal arguments made by Union Carbide and DOW are identical. 11 R. Doc. 30-2 at 2–3. 12 Id. at 5. 13 Id. at 6–7. and any judicially noticed facts.” Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990). “The complaint is construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor.” Lovick v. Ritemoney Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Guidry v. American Public Life Insurance Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007). B. Attachments Supplied by DOW and Union Carbide DOW and Union Carbide attach to their motions excerpts from the “Agreement For Services” between PSC and DOW dated November 22, 2021. They also attach a “Hold Harmless-Responsibility-Insurance Contract”, entered between PSC and DOW dated October 28, 2021. No one has disputed that the parties were operating pursuant to the service agreement at the time of the April 25, 2025 incident. Dillon does not attach or incorporate by reference either the services agreement or the hold harmless agreement in his complaint. Compare Craft v. Max Access LLC, No. 6:22-cv-5899, 2023 WL 5029056, at *4 (W.D. La. Aug. 7, 2023) (allowing for the consideration of a master services agreement due to the complaint’s direct referral to the agreement) with Rampart Allstars, LLC v. Sonder USA Inc., No. 24- cv-1767, 2024 WL 4818273, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 18, 2024) (denying a motion to dismiss but noting that “at least some of [defendant]’s arguments appear to have merit and will be considered at greater length at the appropriate time, upon [defendant]’s filing a motion for summary judgment, when the Court will be free to consider the documents referenced in [defendant]’s motion and is not compelled to simply accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint.”). The documents attached to defendants’ motions may be dispositive of the “statutory” employer issue. Consequently, pursuant to Rule 12(d), the court will treat this matter as one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Though not required to provide explicit notice to the parties when converting to a Rule 56 motion, the court permits Dillon, DOW, and Union Carbide to supply materials they deem necessa
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