A federal job applicant lost his discrimination lawsuit after failing polygraph exams.
Drew Hearn v. Todd Blanche Acting Us Attorney General In His Official
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A federal job applicant lost his discrimination lawsuit after failing polygraph exams.
Why it matters
In Hearn v. Blanche, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary judgment in favor of the government. Drew Hearn, a former DEA Task Force Officer, sued the Acting U.S. Attorney General under Title VII, claiming racial discrimination after the DEA rescinded his conditional job offer as a Special Agent. The court sided with the government, finding that Hearn could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination or show that the stated reason for rescinding his offer, a finding that he used countermeasures during polygraph exams, was a pretext for discrimination.
Who it affects
This ruling directly affects Drew Hearn, whose discrimination claim against the DEA was dismissed. More broadly, it is relevant to federal job applicants who undergo polygraph examinations as part of their hiring process and who may believe adverse results were influenced by discriminatory motives.
What happens next
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Decision issued Oct 2, 2026
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- Decision issued Oct 2, 2026
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DEEPER READ
Drew Hearn worked as a Task Force Officer with the Drug Enforcement Administration and applied to become a DEA Special Agent. He received a conditional job offer in March 2022, but that offer depended on passing several requirements, including a polygraph examination. DEA policy required that any applicant found to have used countermeasures during a polygraph, meaning a conscious or deliberate attempt to manipulate the exam results, be removed from consideration. Hearn took two polygraph exams. His first exam in June 2022 resulted in a 'No Opinion' finding on the Suitability portion, meaning the examiner could not reach a conclusion. His second exam in August 2022 resulted in a finding that he had used countermeasures during both the National Security and Suitability portions. Multiple DEA officials conducted quality control reviews and agreed with those findings. As a result, the DEA rescinded his conditional job offer in August 2022. Hearn was also removed from his Task Force Officer role in September 2023. He filed this lawsuit in January 2025, alleging the DEA engaged in a pattern and practice of intentional racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The government moved for summary judgment, arguing that Hearn could not prove a prima facie case of discrimination and could not show that the polygraph findings were a cover story for racial bias. Hearn responded by claiming he had direct evidence of discrimination, or alternatively, that he had shown a prima facie case or evidence of pretext. The court granted the government's motion. Under the summary judgment standard, Hearn was required to produce competent evidence of a genuine dispute over material facts, and the court found he failed to do so. The source text does not detail the full reasoning beyond the legal standard and procedural posture, but the outcome is that the government was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The source text does not reference a dissent, as this is a district court ruling by a single judge. No appeal is addressed in the available text.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA DREW HEARN CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 25-179 TODD BLANCHE, ACTING U.S. SECTION “B” (5) ATTORNEY GENERAL, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY ORDER Before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 26), Plaintiff’s Opposition (Rec. Doc. 37), and Defendant’s Reply (Rec. Doc. 38). IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 26) be GRANTED. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY Drew Hearn (“Plaintiff”) served as a Task Force Officer with the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) from October 2020 to September 14, 2023. (Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 2; Rec. Doc. 37 at 2.) Around March 26, 2021, Plaintiff applied to become a Special Agent with the DEA and received conditional acceptance for the position on March 21, 2022. (Id.) The acceptance was conditioned upon a legion of requirements, including successful completion of a polygraph examination. (Id.) Notably, an applicant for DEA Special Agent positions who receive a finding of Countermeasure1 on their polygraph exam are removed from consideration. (Id.) Plaintiff’s first polygraph exam occurred on June 15, 2022, administered by Special Agent Kenneth Delgado. (Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 4; Rec Doc. 37 at 3.) Plaintiff received “No Opinion”2 on the Suitability portion of the examination. (Rec. Doc. 26-8 at 2.) Special Agent Paulette Origel 1 Rec. Doc. 26-6 at 4 (Countermeasure is defined as a “conscious or deliberate attempt of the examinee to affect the outcome of the polygraph examination.”). 2 Rec. Doc. 26-6 at 4 (“No Opinion” meaning “a result is unable to be determined. If any relevant question results in NO decision, the polygraph examiner should conduct additional testing…”). conducted a quality control review of the first exam and concurred with the results. (Rec. Doc. 26- 8 at 2). Thereafter, Plaintiff underwent a second polygraph exam on August 4, 2022. (Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 4; Rec. Doc. 37 at 5; Rec. Doc. 26-8 at 2.) Special Agent Stephen Davis conducted the second exam and found that Plaintiff had engaged in countermeasures during the National Security and Suitability portions. (Rec. Doc. 28-8 at 2.) Staff Coordinator Joe Collins conducted a quality control review of the second exam and concurred with the overall results. (Id.). A second quality control review was conducted by DEA Polygraph Unit Chief Daniel Holcomb, who concurred with Staff Coordinator Collin’s findings. (Id.) Due to the two countermeasures, the DEA rescinded Plaintiff’s conditional offer letter on August 16, 2022 (Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 5; Rec Doc. 37 at 5). Approximately a year later, on September 14, 2023, Plaintiff was removed from his role as a DEA Task Force Officer. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2; Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 6.) Plaintiff then initiated this action against the Attorney General of the United States (“Defendant”) on January 27, 2025. (Rec. Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (Id. at 10). Namely, Plaintiff proffers Defendant violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) when “acting within the scope and course of their employment, [the Defendant] engaged in a pattern and practice of intentional discrimination upon [the Plaintiff’s] race…” (Id.) Consequently, Defendant filed its Answer (Rec. Doc. 1) on May 20, 2025. This Court ordered to administratively close this case for statistical purposes on June 25, 2025. (Rec. Doc. 16). This Court also ordered parties to reopen the case and set a preliminary conference no later than September 5, 2025. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Motion to Reopen the Case on September 3, 2025 (Rec. Doc. 17), where this Court granted the motion and reopened the case on September 8, 2025. (Rec. Doc. 18.) On August 4, 2026, Defendant filed this Motion for Summary Judgment.3 (Rec. Doc. 26.) Defendant alleges that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination nor prove that the reasons for withdrawing the conditional offer letter were a pretext for discrimination. (Rec. Doc. 26-1 at 2.) Plaintiff responded with his Opposition, asserting that he has established direct evidence of discrimination, or in the alternative, has proven either a prima facie case of discrimination or a pretext of discrimination. (Rec. Doc. 37.) Defendant replied. (Rec. Doc. 38). II. LAW & ANALYSIS A. Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) & (c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material in support or opposition of a motion for summary judgment may be considered if it is “capable of being ‘presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.’” LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.56(c)(2)). Courts view all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but “refrain from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008); see, e.g., Liedtke v. City of Austin, 185 F.4th 560, 570 (5th Cir. 2026). 3 On August 11, 2026, Defendant filed a Memorandum in Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 32). Within that memorandum, Defendant expressed reasons for denying Plaintiff’s motion to continue the submission date of the motion for summary judgment. Id. Where the movant bears the burden of proof, it must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” using competent summary judgment evidence. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. However, “where the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial, the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence.” Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct at 2553-54; Moody v. Jefferson Par. Sch. Bd., 2 F.3d 604, 606 (5th Cir.1993); Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 190 (5th Cir.1991)). Should the movant meet its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-movant, who must show by “competent summary judgment evidence” that there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Lindsey, 16 F.3d at 618. This burden is not satisfied with “’some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,’ Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, by ‘conclusory allegations,’ Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885-86 (1990), by ‘unsubstantiated assertions,’ Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92 (5th Cir.1994), or by only a ‘scintilla’ of evidence, Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir.1994)”. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). There is no genuine issue of material fact if, when viewing the evidence in the light most favor
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