Most claims against a landlord's lawyers dismissed, but one federal debt collection claim survives.
Latia Thompson Mckoy v. Todd a Kelting, et al.
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Most claims against a landlord's lawyers dismissed, but one federal debt collection claim survives.
Why it matters
In Thompson-McKoy v. Kelting, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland partially granted and partially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court dismissed most of the plaintiff's claims, including those under Section 1983, RICO, TILA, abuse of process, and several state law counts, while allowing part of the plaintiff's Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim to proceed. The plaintiff, a Maryland tenant acting without an attorney, had sued her landlord's lawyers over eviction proceedings related to a lease dispute involving renters insurance requirements.
Who it affects
This ruling directly affects tenants who face eviction proceedings and believe the lawyers handling those proceedings have violated federal debt collection rules. It also affects attorneys and law firms that represent landlords in debt collection and eviction litigation, clarifying that some FDCPA claims against them can proceed in federal court.
What happens next
Current
Decision issued Sep 9, 2026
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Parties can ask the same court to reconsider. Then: possible appeal to the circuit court.
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- Decision issued Sep 9, 2026
- Possible rehearingParties can ask the same court to reconsider.
- Possible appeal to the circuit court
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Sep 9, 2026
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DEEPER READ
The central question in this case was whether a tenant could pursue federal and state law claims against an attorney and law firm who represented her landlord in eviction proceedings arising out of a Baltimore County apartment lease. The plaintiff, Latia Thompson-McKoy, sued Todd A. Kelting, an attorney, and his firm Offit Kurman, P.A., alleging that their conduct during eviction proceedings violated multiple federal and state laws. Her claims included violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, racketeering under RICO, the Truth in Lending Act, abuse of process, fraud, and various Maryland consumer protection statutes. She sought both money damages and court orders blocking further action against her. The court granted the motion to dismiss in large part, eliminating Counts II through VIII as well as one specific FDCPA theory within Count I. The surviving portion of the case is a narrower FDCPA claim under Count I, specifically the plaintiff's claims under Sections 1692e and 1692g, which relate to false or misleading representations and required debt collection notices. The court dismissed the Section 1692f claim within Count I along with all other counts. The source text does not detail the court's full reasoning for each dismissal, but the defendants moved under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56, meaning the court evaluated whether it had jurisdiction, whether the complaints stated legally valid claims, and whether summary judgment was appropriate. No dissent is present in this opinion, as it is a federal district court decision issued by a single judge. The case continues on the surviving FDCPA claims under Sections 1692e and 1692g.
CITATION AND RECORD
Record source: CourtListener
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND ) LATIA THOMPSON-MCKOY, ) ) Plaintiff, pro se, ) ) Civil Action No. 25-cv-01795-LKG v. ) ) Dated: September 9, 2026 TODD A. KELTING, et al. ) ) Defendants. ) ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION I. INTRODUCTION In this civil action, the Plaintiff pro se, Latia Thompson-McKoy brings claims on behalf of herself and her minor son, against the Defendants, Todd A. Kelting, Esq., and Offit Kurman, P.A., arising from a series of eviction proceedings brought against her in the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County, pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.; 42 U.S.C. §1983; the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) and (d); the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, et seq.; and Maryland law. ECF Nos. 1 and 4. The Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on these claims, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 56. ECF No. 28. The motion is fully briefed. See id.; ECF Nos. 28, 28-1, 31 and 32. No hearing is necessary to resolve the motion. See L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1) GRANTS-in-PART and DENIES-in-PART the Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 28); and (2) DISMISSES Counts II-VIII of the complaint and the Plaintiff’s Section 1692f claim in Count I of the complaint. II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1 A. Factual Background In this civil action, the Plaintiff brings claims on behalf of herself and her minor son against the Defendants, arising from certain eviction proceedings before the District Court of Maryland for Baltimore County. ECF No. 4 at ¶¶ 1, 10 and 15. Specifically, the Plaintiff asserts the following claims against the Defendants in the complaint: (1) violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f and 1692g (Count I); (2) deprivation of property without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II); (3) violation of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) (Count III); (4) abuse of process and fraud on the court (Count IV); (5) violation of the MCDCA, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 14-202 (Count V); (6) supplemental state law claims under the MCDCA, the MCPA, Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 7-301 and common law fraud and misrepresentation (Count VI); (7) violation of the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. (Count VIII); and (8) declaratory and injunctive relief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (Count VIII). See generally ECF No. 4. As relief, the Plaintiff seeks, among other things, certain declaratory and injunctive relief and to recover actual and punitive damages from the Defendants. Id. at Prayer for Relief. The Parties Plaintiff Latia Thompson-McKoy is a Maryland resident. Id. at ¶ 7. Defendant Todd A. Kelting, Esq. is an attorney licensed in Maryland who, at all relevant times to this case, acted as counsel for UDR, Inc. (“UDR”). Id. at ¶ 8. Mr. Kelting represents UDR and works for Defendant Offit Kurman, P.A. Id. Defendant Offit Kurman, P.A. is a law firm that is located in Bethesda, Maryland and regularly engages in landlord-tenant and debt-collection litigation in Maryland courts. Id. at ¶ 9. The Plaintiff’s Lease Agreement As background, the Plaintiff and her minor son reside in an apartment (the “Apartment”) located at 20 Lambourne Road, Towson, Maryland. Id. at ¶¶ 7 and 10. On or about October 29, 2024, the Plaintiff executed a lease agreement with Consolidated- Hampton, LLC to lease the Apartment (the “Lease Agreement”). Id. at ¶14A. The Lease Agreement provides that the Plaintiff will pay $1,680.00 per month in rent, made payable to UDR/20 Lambourne (“UDR”) ECF No. 28-4 at 8. The Lease Agreement also requires that the Plaintiff buy and maintain renters’ insurance, and that a failure to maintain the required renters’ insurance is an incurable breach of the Lease Agreement that may result in the termination of tenancy and eviction. Id. at 9. In this regard, Section 8 of the Lease Agreement provides that: 8. INSURANCE. We do not maintain insurance to cover your personal property or personal injury. We are not responsible to any resident, guest, or occupant for damage or loss of personal property or personal injury from (including but not limited to) fire, smoke, rain, flood, water and pipe leaks, hail, ice, snow lighting, wind, explosions, earthquake, interruption of utilities, theft, hurricane negligence of other residents, occupants, or invited/uninvited guests or vandalism unless otherwise required by law. You [Plaintiff] are required to buy and maintain renters insurance naming the owner as an insured in the minimum amount of $_______________ for property and $100000.00 for personal liability. If a minimum coverage amount is left blank, you are not required to have that type of insurance. * * * Failure to maintain required insurance throughout your tenancy, including any renewal periods and/or lease extension, is an incurable breach of this Lease Contract and may result in the termination of tenancy and eviction and/or any other remedies as provided by this Lease Contract or state law. Id. at 9. In addition, “Rider 1 to Lease Addendum Liability Insurance Required of Resident,” addresses tew failure to maintain liability insurance and provides, in relevant part, that: 3. DEFAULT AND FORCE PLACEMENT. Except where prohibited by law, failure to obtain and maintain liability insurance as required under the Lease Contract and this Addendum is an immediate, material default under the terms of your Lease Contract. In such event, we will send a written notice to you demanding that you cure the violation by procuring the required insurance and supplying evidence of coverage to us. If you fail to obtain and supply evidence of such insurance to us on or before the date set forth in your notice, we shall be entitled to exercise all rights and remedies under the Lease Contract and applicable law, including but not limited to the right to procure liability-only insurance coverage on your behalf and at your sole cost and expenses, but we shall be under no obligation to procure such coverage on your behalf. SUCH COVERAGE SHALL PROTECT ONLY OUR INTERESTS, AND WILL NOT COVER ANY OF YOUR PERSONAL PROPERTY OR OFFSET ANY OF YOUR LIABILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES THAT YOU MAY BE HELD ACCONTABLE FOR, AND SHALL REMAIN IN PLACE DURING THE TERM OF THE
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